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This dissertation addresses issues in corporate risk management. Part I 
examines the determinants for corporate decisions to commodity hedge and to 
the extent of hedging. Chapter 1 discusses prior literature, including theory and 
empirical evidence on corporate risk management. It provides the background 
to support the empirical analyses of Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 2 examines 
corporate decisions to commodity hedge. I find that firms are more likely to 
hedge when they are big, have risk management department set up and have 
more of their competitors hedge. Chapter 3 investigates what determines the 
extent of hedging conditional on hedging decisions and the cross-sectional and 
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time series deviation of the hedge ratio. I find that firms tend to hedge less 
when they have younger CEOs and have more options in their compensation 
plan. 
I also find that when determining the hedge ratio, firms with young CEOs and 
higher option compensation tend to respond to past commodity price growth 
and to deviate from industry average.  Part II investigates the relationship 
between corporate risk management and product market competition. Chapter 
4 examines the different product market performance for firms with different 
hedging polices after commodity price shocks. I find that unhedged firms 
which are ex ante financially constrained lose market share and experience a 
decreased profitability during and after commodity price shocks. Chapter 5 
examines whether the loss of unhedged constrained firms in product market is 
driven by the competitors. I find that firms with financial advantages—
unconstrained hedged firms—tend to increase advertising expenditures and 
decrease price-cost-margins during negative commodity shocks, indicating that 
the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms is due to increased 
competition in the product market. Chapter 6 examines whether corporate risk 
management affects the likelihood of firms exiting the market. I find that 
constrained unhedged firms are 6% more likely to exit the market than their 
unconstrained hedged rivals and the effects are stronger in concentrated 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction to Corporate Risk Management 
 
1.1     Introduction 
The corporate risk management literature has increased in popularity for the past two 
decades as derivative markets develop. Many studies focus on the rationales for firms‘ 
hedging and suggest several reasons that firms should hedge: hedging relieves under-/over-
investment costs1, decreases financial distress costs2, reduces taxes3 and decreases agency 
costs4. Despite all the rationales the literature suggests, less than 50% of firms hedge in any 
type of hedging, less than 30% of firms hedge commodity exposures and the average hedge 
ratio5 among the firms that do hedge is less than 30%.  
Although many studies have dedicated to risk management determinants, it is still 
unclear what drives firms to hedge and how much to hedge. Part of the reason of the lack of 
a consensus is the lack of broad data on hedging, especially across-industry commodity 
hedging. To address these questions, I examine the hedging policies of 579 firms in 10 
industry groups over the period of 1994-2008. Specifically, Chapter 2 investigates the factors 
that associate with firms‘ decisions to hedge and the dynamic change from non-hedgers to 
hedgers for the first time. Chapter 3 investigates the extent of hedging conditional on 
                                                 
1 See Smith and Stulz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993),  Lin and Smith (2003), and many others  
2 See Haushalter (2000), Rogers (2002) and Dionne and Garand (2003), etc 
3 See Smith and Stulz (1985), Tufano (1996), Graham and Smith (1999), Graham and Rogers (2002), etc 
4 See Tufano (1996), Stulz (1990), Triki (2004, 2005), etc 
5 Hedge ratio is defined as notional dollar amount hedged divided by last year‘s exposure.  
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hedging. Chapter 4 studies what drives firms to hedge differently from their competitors and 
closely examines the hedging policies for different industries.   
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the literature related to the 
theories of corporate risk management. It establishes the framework to test the determinants 
of hedging. Section 1.3 reviews the empirical studies on corporate hedging.  It shows the 
merits and limitations of past literature and how my dissertation may contribute to the 
literature. Finally, Section 1.4 concludes the chapter.  
1.2     Theories on Corporate Risk Management  
Hedging that smoothes cash flow should not affect firm value in the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) framework. Several theoretical studies argue that corporate risk management activities 
are value-enhancing by introducing frictions to the perfect Modigliani and Miller world.   
The tax argument is first introduced by Smith and Stulz (1985). They augue that if the 
firm faces a convex tax function, because hedging reduces the volatility of the firm‘s cash 
flow, by Jensen‘s inequality the firm will have a lower tax liability. Therefore, for a firm with 
convex tax function, as long as hedging costs are greater than its benefits, hedging enhances 
after tax firm value. This prediction is confirmed by Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993) and 
many other following studies.  
Smith and Stulz (1985) also suggest that financial distress costs provide a valid 
explanation to corporate risk management because firms with hedging activities face lower 
probability of financial distress.  They argue that hedging can decrease the present value of 
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financial distress costs for a fixed investment policy. Consequently, hedging increases firm 
value because it decreases the expected value of direct bankruptcy costs and the loss of debt 
tax shield. The prediction is confirmed by Berkman and Bradbury (1996) and Haushalter 
(2000) and other studies.  
Underinvestment problem is another popular explanation of corporate risk 
management. It describes cases where shareholders forego positive net present value 
projects because the gains mainly go to bondholders [see Myers (1977)]. Hedging can 
decrease the underinvestment costs by shifting cash from states in which income are 
sufficient to meet the firm‘s obligations to states where cash flows are insufficient to do so. 
Furthermore, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) show that, when the cost of external 
financing is higher than the cost of internal financing, hedging can alleviate the 
underinvestment problem because it ensures the availability of internally generated funds to 
meet the need of the firm‘s investment opportunities. Morellec and Smith (2002) and Lin 
and Smith (2003) consider simultaneously the financing, investment and risk management 
decisions and also prove a positive relationship between hedging and the firm‘s investment 
opportunities.  
Agency cost is another rationale for firms‘ hedging activities. Managers are usually less 
diversified than regular investors because they have the present value of future 
compensations tied to the firm‘s value. Consequently, they will require additional 
compensation if they feel exposed to a high level of risk through the firm. Hence, managerial 
risk aversion provides an incentive for corporate hedging because risk management could 
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lower equilibrium managerial compensation. Smith and Stulz (1985) show that compensation 
packages that lead to a concave function between the managers‘ expected utility and the 
firm‘s value should encourage managers to hedge more. Accordingly, managers holding a 
significant fraction of the firm‘s shares should engage more actively in risk management. 
Smith and Stulz (1985) also suggest that managers with important options holdings hedge 
less because options provide a convex relationship between the managers‘ utility and the 
firm‘s value. Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002), among others, find support for this argument. 
However, Carpenter (2000) argues that stock options have two opposing effects on 
corporate hedging. First, as the volatility of the firm stock returns increases, the payoffs from 
options become more important. This effect leads managers to hedge less. Second, as the 
stock price decreases, the payoffs from options become less important. This effect drives 
managers to increase their hedging to avoid further drop in the share price. The hypotheses 
are confirmed by evidences shown in Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) and Géczy, Minton 
and Schrand (1997).  
1.3     Empirical Evidence on Corporate Risk Management  
After the literature established theories of corporate risk management determinants, many 
empirical works developed to test the predications of the theories. Nance, Smith and 
Smithson (1993) is one popular study among early works. They use survey data on firms' use 
of forwards, futures, swaps, and options of 169 firms in 1986. They find that firms which 
hedge have more convex tax functions, have less coverage of fixed claims, are larger, have 
more growth options in their investment opportunity set, and employ fewer hedging 
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substitutes. Although their work is broad, survey data is subject to response bias that firms 
which hedge are more likely to respond to the survey6. Another drawback of the paper is 
that they do not test the extent of hedging because of the data availability.  
Tufano (1996) examines a detailed corporate risk management dataset in the North 
American gold mining industry. He finds little empirical support for the theories that view 
risk management as a means to maximize shareholder value. However, he finds that firms 
whose managers have more options hedge less gold price risk, and firms whose managers 
hold more stock hedge more gold price risk. He also finds that risk management is negatively 
associated with the tenure of firms' CFOs. His empirical results suggest that managerial risk 
aversion and preferences may affect corporate risk management policy. Although for gold 
mining industry only, Tufano (1996) examines risk management in detail and sets a good 
example for further studies. Many other papers7 use this detailed dataset for the gold mining 
industry, which is ended in 1999.  
Mian (1996) uses a sample of 3,022 firms with hedging data from the 1992 annual 
reports. She finds evidence inconsistent with financial distress cost models; evidence mixed 
with respect to contracting costs, capital market imperfections, and tax-based models; and 
evidence supports the hypothesis that hedging activities exhibit economies of scale. The 
paper has a very large sample compared to previous studies. Nevertheless, the paper uses a 
                                                 
6 In their sample, they sent out 535 surveys to all Fortune 500 and the S&P 400 firms. 169 firms completed the 
survey among which 104 firms used hedging instruments in 1986.   
7 See Dionne and Garand (2003), Brown, Crabb and Haushalter (2003) among others.  
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dummy variable to capture whether firms have outstanding hedging instruments and does 
not examine the extent of hedging.  
 Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) use a sample of 372 Fortune 500 nonfinancial firms 
in 1990 to examine the use of currency derivatives. They find that firms with greater growth 
opportunities and tighter financial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives. 
They also find that firms with more foreign exchange-rate exposure and economies of scale 
in hedging activities are more likely to use currency derivatives. 
Haushalter (2000) studies the hedging policies of oil and gas producers between 1992 
and 1994. He finds that the extent of hedging is related to financing costs. Firms with greater 
financial leverage manage price risks more extensively. He also finds that the likelihood of 
hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs and to the basis risk of hedging 
instruments. Larger companies are more likely to manage risks and companies which are 
located in regions where prices have a high correlation with the prices of exchange traded 
derivatives are more likely to hedge.  
Purnanandam (2008) uses a comprehensive data set for 1996 and 1997. He finds a non-
monotonic relation between leverage and hedging.  He also finds that the effect of leverage 
on hedging is more significant for firms in highly concentrated industries. 
My dissertation supports several explanations for corporate risk management. First, 
firms in weak financial situation are less likely to hedge, which is consistent with fixed cost 
of setting up hedging program and inaccessibility in the derivative market. Consistent with 
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the notion, Haushalter (2000) and Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find a positive 
correlation between the decision to hedge and total assets.   
 Second, the correlation between firms‘ hedging activities and managerial risk aversion is 
consistent with the stream of literature showing that firms‘ hedging decisions are related to 
managerial stock and option compensation. For example, Tufano (1996), Rajgopal and 
Shelvin (2002) and Rogers (2002) find that managers with higher options holdings hedge less 
because options compensation create a convex relation between the managers‘ utility and the 
firm‘s value. But on the other hand, Carpenter (2000), Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) 
and Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find the opposite relationship between stock 
options compensation and hedge ratio.  Carpenter (2000) argues that managers hedge more 
with more options holdings in order to avoid large drop in stock price, which makes their 
options holdings less valuable. The results in my dissertation support the first set of literature 
and show that CEOs with higher risk appetite—younger CEOs and CEOs with higher 
options compensation tend to hedge less.  
My dissertation is closely related to Haushalter (2000) that separately examines the 
determinants of decision to hedge and the extent of hedging. Similar to Haushalter (2000), I 
also find that the determinants of whether to hedge and how much to hedge are very 
different. My study has three important distinctions from his work and the rest of the 
literature. First, I have a relative long sample period of 1994 to 2008. It allows me to directly 
test what drives the firms‘ dynamic changes from non-hedgers in the past to hedgers. I find 
that firms are more likely to hedge for the first time when they increase their leverage, their 
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debt ratings and profitability improve and when the concentration in industry increases. The 
results suggest that firms start to hedge when the benefit of hedging increases and when 
their ability to hedge increases. The long sample period also allows me to test whether the 
extent of hedging changes according to past commodity price growth. I find that firms 
increase the amount they hedge when past commodity price increases and firms with young 
CEO and more option compensation tend to respond to past commodity price growth.     
The second distinction is that, unlike other studies, this study has multiple industry 
samples, which allows me to analyze the between-industry difference on why firms do not 
hedge. The paper tests the determinants of firms whose hedge ratios deviate from industry 
average.  I find that firms with young CEOs and higher option compensation ratio in low 
Herfindahl industry tend to hedge less even when their competitors hedge more. The results 
suggest that those CEOs tend to be over-confident with less risk aversion. It also suggests 
that firms are more likely to hedge less in a highly competitive industry with a low 
Herfindahl index because they are subject to less predation risk in those industries.  
Third, most the studies use Tobit model8 to examine the determinants of the decisions 
to hedge, while others use Cragg model9.  Although the Tobit model has received extensive 
use in hedge ratio analysis, it has the restriction that the same factors are assumed to affect 
the probability of hedging and the magnitude of the hedge in the same way given that a 
hedge is conducted. In the Cragg model, it is assumed that the probability of hedging and 
hedge ratio regressions are assumed to be independent. This assumption is somewhat 
                                                 
88 For example, Tufano (1996) and Rogers (2002) 
9 See Haushalter (2000) 
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unrealistic. To address the above issues, I use a Heckman selection model, which allows the 
variables affecting each decision to differ, but does not require that the two equations be 
independent. 
1.4     Conclusions  
This chapter presents a brief overview of the theories and empirical evidence related to 
corporate risk management. It is clear that there are different rationales for firms to conduct 
hedging activities. It is also true that there exists evidence consistent with different hedging 
theories for certain industries and certain sample period. However, there is still no general 
evidence for the determinants of the extent of hedging for other industries than gold mining 
and oil and gas industries. Furthermore, it remains unclear how firms change their hedging 
activities dynamically over time.  Chapter 3 and 4 in this dissertation address these questions. 
Another obvious question is, if managers believe hedging is beneficial, why do not all 
firms hedge and why some firms hedge less than their competitors. Chapter 2 and 4 in this 





Chapter 2  
Decisions of Corporate Risk Management 
 
2.1     Introduction 
In this chapter, I investigate the factors that associate with firms‘ decisions to hedge and the 
dynamic change from non-hedgers to hedgers for the first time. I examine the hedging 
policies of 579 firms in 10 industry groups over the period of 1994-2008. Specifically, I find 
that firms are more likely to hedge when they are bigger, hedge other type of exposures10 and 
when a larger portion of their competitors hedges. On the other hand, firms that do not 
hedge are the smaller firms, with less debt, but higher KZ measures and lower profitability. 
In general lower leverage ratio could indicate more financial flexibility. However, together 
with a higher KZ index, lower debt rating and lower profitability, less debt is more likely to 
be a signal that the firms are financially constrained and cannot acquire enough debt. The 
results suggest that those firms do not hedge because they do not have enough financial 
resources to develop a risk management department or to find counterparties for the 
derivative contracts. I also find that firms are more likely to hedge for the first time if their 
KZ index decreases, debt rating increases or profitability increases. It suggests that firms 
                                                 
10 ―Hedge other type‖ is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm hedge interest rate or exchange rate. It is a 
proxy for setting up the risk management department.  
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start to hedge when their financial situations improve and allow them to set up a hedging 
program.  
The results are consistent with Haushalter (2000) and Géczy, Minton, and Schrand 
(1997) who find a positive correlation between the decision to hedge and total assets.  Firms 
in weak financial situation are less likely to hedge, which is consistent with fixed cost of 
setting up hedging program and inaccessibility in the derivative market.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data used in 
this chapter. Section 2.3 discusses the methodology used to analyze the determinants of 
hedging and presents the results. Section 2.4 concludes the chapter. 
2.2     Data 
The sample consists of manufacturing and airline industries which have hedgeable 
commodities as significant inputs components. I identify industries with commodity inputs 
using the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) benchmark input-output tables in 2002. 
I rank the percentage of commodity usage in each industry‘s total inputs, where commodities 
are defined as 30 hedgable commodities traded on the Chicago Merchandise Exchange, the 
Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Merchandise Exchange. The list of two-digit-
SIC industries is reported in Table 2.1. 
The sample covers the period of 1994-2008 because SEC electronic data becomes 
available in 1994.  The sample consists of 976 firms and 31 three-digit-SIC industries. I 
exclude: (1) firms without 10-K or 10-Q forms in SEC EDGAR, (2) firms with less than 
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three years of data after the commodity shock11, (3) firms with negative sales or asset data 
during the sample period, (4) industries with only one firm. After applying the above rules, I 
obtain the final sample of 579 firms, 6276 firm-year observations. I compare the 
characteristics of the final sample used in this paper, of all manufacturing firms and of all 
Compustat firms. The summary statistics of different samples are reported in Appendix B. 
The final sample used in the paper consists of more mature and larger firms, firms with 
lower R&D expenses, higher financial constraints and higher industry concentration.  
Hedging data are hand collected with keyword searching in 10-K forms from SEC 
EDGAR. The keywords used include: ―hedg‖, ―derivative‖, ―market risk‖ and ―raw 
material‖. Then the paragraph around the keywords is read to identify whether it is a hedge, 
what kind of hedge it is12, what kind of derivatives they use, the notional value and the fair 
value of the hedge if available. A natural hedge is identified when a firm states in the filings 
that it uses long-term contracts with either supplier or consumers to fix the price for at least 
one year13. Pass-throughs are not considered to be natural hedges unless there is a written 
contract of passing most of the input price increase to the customers. I exclude pass-through 
as an effective hedge because large increases in the input price are hard to pass-through to 
customers if there is competition in the industry. Hedge14 dummy equals to 1 if the firm 
hedges any type of exposure or if the firm uses natural hedges during the fiscal year. The 
                                                 
11 I discuss the potential survival bias by restricting firms with five years data in section IV. Generally, including 
only firms who survive for three years after a shock underestimates the results of predation because the exiting 
firms are more likely to be the target of predation and those firms tend to be financially constrained and 
unhedged.     
12 I classify hedges into interest rate hedge, exchange rate hedge and commodity hedge.  
13 Firms can also match input and output currency as a natural hedge for exchange rate risk.  
14 In some tests, Hedge dummy may be restricted to commodity hedge.  
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hedge ratio is the total notional amount of derivatives divided by cost of goods sold (COGS) 
except for the Airline industry where all firms report notional amount of derivatives as a 
percentage of anticipated usage of a commodity. Refer to appendix A for details on the 
hedge ratio and the notional value of hedges.   Refer to Appendix A for more details on 
hedging data.  
Other data sources are as following. Firm characteristics are from Compustat. Stock 
return data are from CRSP. Cotton prices are from the National Cotton Council of America. 
Lumber prices are from Random Length, a wood industry website. Crude oil, natural gas and 
jet fuel prices are from the Energy Information Administration. Metal price data are from 
Commodity Research Bureau, which collects data from the American Metal Market.  
 
2.3     Methodology and Results 
2.3.1    Methodology 
In order to separately examine corporate decisions to hedge and extent of hedging, two-
stage Heckman model is used. The first stage of Heckman consists of the following Probit 
regressions of corporate hedging. 
    (      |             )                                            (2.1) 
where      is a vector of control variables, including leverage, KZ, debt rating, 
investment, ROA, dividends ratio, cash holdings, Herfindahl index, log of tax loss carry 




       is a vector of exogenous variables that affect whether firms hedge but less likely to 
affect hedge ratio in the second stage.  
                                                                        (2.2) 
           is the total assets for firm i at time t;          is firm age at time t-1; Firm size 
and age proxy for firm visibility, which affects whether firms hedge, but not the extent of 
hedging15.              is the dummy variable that equals to one if firm i hedge other type 
of risk, interest rate risk or foreign exchange rate risk in the past up to t-1. It is a proxy for 
that the corporate risk management program has already been set up.              is the 
percentage of firms hedge in the three-digit SIC industry, except for firm i itself. Evidence16 
shows that firms are more likely to hedge when more of their competitors are doing so. 
    Other variables used in this chapter are defined as follows. Size is the market value at 
the end of each year. Age is the years since it first appears in CRSP. R&D expense is scaled by 
sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. Long term debt is the long 
term debt scaled by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investment 
divided by the total asset. Current ratio is current asset divided by current liability. KZ index is 
defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo, (2001) formula. Operating profit margin is the 
gross income divided by total sales. ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. 
                                                 
15 Haushalter (2000) and Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) find a positive correlation between the decision to 
hedge and total assets. Haushalter (2000) also find that firm size is less important in determining hedge ratio. 
16 Nian (2004) and Adam and Nian (2008) 
16 
 
Q is the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the total assets. Herfindahl 
is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Number of firms 
is the number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Debt Rating is the index of S&P debt rating, 
with 0 means no rating, 1 means under C, 21 means AAA, etc. LTLCF is the log of 1+Tax 
Loss Carry Forward. Young_CEO is the dummy variable that equals to one if the age of CEO 
is under 45. Stock Compensation ratio is value of stock compensation divided by total 
compensation. Option Compensation ratio is the value of options compensation divided by total 
compensation. 
The summary statistics of the characteristics of each of the three hedging frequency 
groups are reported in Table 2.2. Firms that do not hedge tend to be younger, smaller, with 
less R&D expenses and lower investment. They also have lower measures of profitability 
and lower leverage ratio. Firms that hedge less than industry median tend to be older, with 
less R&D expenses and lower investment. They also have young CEOs and have higher 
stock and options compensation ratio. Firms that hedge more than industry median are 
bigger firms, have better performance and higher firm value.   
In additional to the decision to hedge, I also analyze firms‘ dynamic changes from non-
hedgers to hedgers for the first time since the firms start to appear in SEC EDGAR database. 
Analyzing this dynamic change would shed some light on what determines the change and 
why firms do not hedge in general.  
The following Probit regressions are conducted.   
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    (      |       )   (        )                                (2.3) 
where     is a binary variable that equals to 1 if firms hedge for the first time.       is a 
vector of control variables, including the changes of firm size, leverage, KZ, debt rating, 
investment, ROA, dividends ratio, cash holdings, Herfindahl index, log of tax loss carry 
forward, stock compensation ratio and option compensation ratio and the level of young 
CEO and firm age.   
2.3.2     Results 
The results on corporate decisions to hedge are reported in Table 2.5. Firm size, debt 
ratio, debt rating, and stock compensation ratio are positively correlated with corporate 
decisions to hedge, while KZ index, rating less than BBB dummy and Herfindahl are 
negatively correlated with probability of hedging. The results are consistent with the majority 
of the literature that bigger firms with higher leverage are more likely to hedge.   
In addition to the results which are consistent with previous literature, I also find that 
Other Hedge dummy, which is 1 when firms ever hedge other type of exposure in the past, are 
positively related to firms‘ likelihood of hedge. It suggests that firms with established risk 
management program are more likely to hedge commodity exposure too. Furthermore, I 
find the percentage of hedgers in an industry positively affects firms‘ decisions to hedge, 
which indicates a spillover effect on corporate decisions to hedge.   
Among all the determinants, firm size, the percentage of hedgers in industry and debt 
rating are the top three important characteristics. About 24-35% of variation in probability 
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of hedging is explained in the model. It is consistent with the view that the firms do not 
hedge when they are in the very weak financial situation that they do not have enough 
financial recourses to set up the hedging program.  
All independent variables are measured at t-1. Model (3)-(4) include industry and year 
effects and Model (5)-(6) include industry by year effects. All models report T-stats 
calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level. 
All the independent variables in Heckman second stage (Equation 3.1, Table 3.1) are 
included together with the four instrument variables in       . Some of the variables have no 
explanatory power and are not reported.  
Table 2.6 reports the results for the dynamic changes of firms from non-hedgers to 
hedgers for the first time. Results show that when their debt ratio, debt rating, return of 
assets and stock compensation ratio increases at time t-1, and when the KZ index and option 
compensation ratio decreases at time t-1, the firms are more likely to start to hedge for the 
first time at time t. Among all the determinants, debt rating and return of assets increase are 
the most important factors associated with the change from non-hedgers to hedgers. It 
suggests that firms would start to hedge if their credit rating and profitability are better than 
before. The results indicate that the weak financial situation might be the main reason why 
firms cannot hedge.      
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     2.4     Conclusions 
In this chapter, I investigate the factors that associate with firms‘ decisions to hedge and the 
dynamic change from non-hedgers to hedgers for the first time. I find that firms are more 
likely to hedge when they are bigger, have risk management department set up and have 
more of their competitors hedge. On the other hand, firms that do not hedge are the smaller 
firms, with less debt, but higher KZ measures and lower profitability. The results suggest 
that those firms do not hedge because they do not have enough financial resources to 
develop a risk management department or to find counterparties for the derivative contracts. 
I also find that firms are more likely to hedge for the first time if their KZ index decreases 
and debt rating increases. It suggests that firms start to hedge when their financial situations 
improve and allow them to set up a hedging program.  






Chapter 3  
Extent of Corporate Risk Management 
 
3.1     Introduction 
Another important risk management policy, in addition to whether to hedge, is to decide 
how much to hedge. In this chapter, I investigate the factors that associate with the extent of 
corporate risk management. 
Among all the studies that focus on the determinants of corporate risk management, 
less than 50% of the studies use a continuous measure of hedging 17 . Other than data 
availability, another important reason for the lack of continuous measure is that the gross 
notional value of hedging derivatives might overestimate the risk management activities 
when the firms hold offsetting contracts. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) point out an additional 
problem in the gross notional value for foreign exchange rate hedging. They emphasize that 
firms do not report derivatives holdings by individual currency and seem first to net 
positions on these currencies before aggregating them.  
The data sample in my dissertation has advantages to overcome these concerns on 
using gross notional value as a measure of the extent of hedging. First, this chapter focuses 
on commodity hedging, which does not suffer the reporting problems mentioned in 
                                                 
17 See the review in Triki (2005) 
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Allayannis and Ofek (2001). Second, my sample consists of commodity-input industries 
whose hedging activities are mainly on their input commodity exposures. These firms are 
less likely to hold offsetting contracts for their commodity hedging. Therefore, the measures 
on the extent of hedging I use in my dissertation are less subject to overestimation bias. 
Third, because my sample consists of commodity-input industries, I can scale the gross 
notional value of the derivatives contracts by the cost of goods sold (COGS) to measure the 
percentage of commodity exposures being hedged directly. By contrast, the literature usually 
scales the gross notional value of the derivatives contracts by total assets, which does not 
directly capture the exposures of commodity price risk.    
I examine the hedging policies of 579 firms in 10 industry groups over the policies of 
579 firms in 10 industry groups over the period of 1994-2008. Specifically, I find that firms 
with younger CEOs and have more options in their compensation plans hedge less of their 
exposures. The results suggest that managerial risk preference play an important role in 
setting up the extent of hedging. The results are consistent with Tufano (1996), which 
analyzes the hedging activities in the gold mining industry in 1986.  
Furthermore, I find that the hedge ratio18 is positively correlated with past commodity 
price growth rate. The firms with young CEO and higher option compensation are more 
likely to form their hedge ratios according to the past commodity price growth.  It suggests 
that firms may deviate inversely from the optimal hedge ratio19 according to past commodity 
price growth and managers with higher risk appetite are more likely to deviate. I also find 
                                                 
18 Hedge ratio is defined as gross notional value of derivatives contracts divided by cost of goods sold.  
19 Assume there is only one optimal hedge ratio for the firms with certain characteristics.   
22 
 
that firms‘ hedge ratio is higher when the average hedge ratio in industry 20 is higher. It 
suggests that there is a spillover effect on the extent of hedging. The results are also 
consistent with the notion that competition in the product market affects corporate risk 
management 21 . Part II of my dissertation investigates this question in more detail. 
Interestingly, I find that the firms with higher debt ratio, young CEO22 and higher option 
compensation are more likely to be independent from industry average hedge ratio.  It 
suggests that firms may deviate from the optimal hedge ratio in the cross-section from their 
industry average and managers with higher risk appetite are more likely to deviate.    
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data an 
variables used in this chapter. Section 3.3 discusses the methodology used to analyze the 
determinants of the extent of hedging. Section 3.4 presents the results and Section 3.5 
concludes the chapter. 
3.2     Data 
The sample consists of manufacturing and airline industries which have hedgeable 
commodities as significant inputs components. I identify industries with commodity inputs 
using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) benchmark input-output tables in 2002. I 
rank the percentage of commodity usage in each industry‘s total inputs, where commodities 
are defined as 30 hedgable commodities traded on the Chicago Merchandise Exchange, the 
                                                 
20 The average hedge ratio in industry is calculated without the firm i itself. 
21 See Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007), Mello and Ruckes (2005) and Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) 
for details.  
22 Morin and Suarez (1983), Pålsson (1996) find that the investor's risk aversion increases with age. Rajgopal, 
and Shevlin (2002), among others, find empirical evidence on the positive correlation between stock option 
compensation and risk taking.  
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Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Merchandise Exchange. The list of two-digit-
SIC industries is reported in Table 2.1.  
The sample covers the period of 1994-2008 because SEC electronic data becomes 
available in 1994.  The final sample consists of 579 firms, 31 three-digit-SIC industries and 
6276 firm-year observations. The details of this sample are discussed in Chapter 2. 
Hedging data are hand collected with keyword searching in 10-K forms from SEC 
EDGAR. Hedge23 dummy equals to 1 if the firm hedges any type of exposure or if the firm 
uses natural hedges during the fiscal year. The hedge ratio is the total notional amount of 
derivatives divided by cost of goods sold (COGS) except for the Airline industry where all 
firms report notional amount of derivatives as a percentage of anticipated usage of a 
commodity. Refer to appendix A for details on the hedge ratio and the notional value of 
hedges.    
3.3     Methodology  
In order to separately examine corporate decisions to hedge and extent of hedging, two-
stage Heckman model is used. The second stage of Heckman consists of the following 
regressions of hedge ratio. 
                                                                     (3.1) 
Under the assumption of error terms are jointly normal, we have  
                                                 
23 In some tests, Hedge dummy may be restricted to commodity hedge.  
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                                                                 (3.2) 
Where      is firms‘ hedge ratio at time t;      is a vector of control variables, including 
PastCom, which is the commodity price growth rate at time t-1, AveHe, which is the average 
hedge ratio in industry j except firm i at time t-1, leverage, KZ, debt rating, investment, ROA, 
dividends ratio, cash holdings, Herfindahl index, log of tax loss carry forward, young CEO 
dummy, stock compensation ratio and option compensation ratio.      is the binary variable 
of whether firms hedge predicted in the first stage of Heckman model.         is a vector of 
instrumental variables defined in chapter 2.        includes firms size, age, hedge other 
exposures and percentage of hedgers in industry.  
    Other variables used in this chapter are defined as follows. Size is the market value at 
the end of each year. Age is the years since it first appears in CRSP. R&D expense is scaled by 
sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. Long term debt is the long 
term debt scaled by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investment 
divided by the total asset. Current ratio is current asset divided by current liability. KZ index is 
defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo, (2001) formula. Operating profit margin is the 
gross income divided by total sales. ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. 
Q is the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the total assets. Herfindahl 
is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Number of firms 
is the number of firms in a 3-digit-SIC industry. Debt Rating is the index of S&P debt rating, 
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with 0 means no rating, 1 means under C, 21 means AAA, etc. LTLCF is the log of 1+Tax 
Loss Carry Forward. Young_CEO is the dummy variable that equals to one if the age of CEO 
is less than 45. Stock Compensation ratio is value of stock compensation divided by total 
compensation. Option Compensation ratio is the value of options compensation divided by total 
compensation. 
In additional to the base models of the extent of hedging, I also analyze the time series 
and cross-sectional deviation of hedge ratio.  Analyzing these deviations would shed some 
light on what determines the extent of hedging and what drives managers to deviate from 
optimal hedge ratio.   
To examine the effects of past commodity prices on hedge ratio, the following 
regressions are conducted.   
 [     |                          ]                                                (3.3) 
Where      is firms‘ hedge ratio at time t;              is  the commodity price growth 
rate at time t-1;      is a vector of control variables, including leverage, KZ, debt rating, 
investment, ROA, dividends ratio, cash holdings, Herfindahl index, log of tax loss carry 
forward, young CEO dummy, stock compensation ratio and option compensation ratio.      
is the binary variable of whether firms hedge predicted in the first stage of Heckman model.  
       is a vector of instrumental variables defined in chapter 2.                     is the 
interaction terms of firms‘ characteristics and past commodity price growth rates. The 
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interaction terms capture the determinants for firms to deviate from their optimal hedge 
ratio according to the past commodity price growth rate.   
To examine the effects of industry average hedge ratio on firms‘ hedge ratio, the 
following regressions are conducted.   
 [     |                        ]                                              (3.4) 
Where       is firms‘ hedge ratio at time t;            is the average hedge ratio in 
industry j except firm i at time t-1;      is a vector of control variables, including leverage, 
KZ, debt rating, investment, ROA, dividends ratio, cash holdings, Herfindahl index, log of 
tax loss carry forward, young CEO dummy, stock compensation ratio and option 
compensation ratio.      is the binary variable of whether firms hedge predicted in the first 
stage of Heckman model.         is a vector of instrumental variables defined in chapter 2. 
                  is the interaction terms of firms‘ characteristics and industry hedge ratio. 
The interaction terms capture the determinants for firms to choose different hedge ratio 
from its industry average.   
3.4     Results 
 3.4.1     The extent of hedging 
The results of the extent of hedging are reported in Table 3.1. I find that debt rating, 
Young CEO dummy and option compensation ratio are negatively correlated with the extent 
of hedging. The results are consistent with Tufano (1996) that firms with less risk averse 
managers hedge less of their exposures. Morin and Suarez (1983), Pålsson (1996) and other 
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studies on general investor‘s risk aversion find that the investor's risk aversion increases with 
age. Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000) find that CEO age is negatively related to stock price 
volatility. Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that a trader's expected level of overconfidence is 
higher in the early stages of his career. Rajgopal, and Shevlin (2002), among others, find 
empirical evidence on the positive correlation between stock option compensation and risk 
taking. So, the results suggest that managerial risk preferences play an important role when 
setting up hedging policies on the extent of hedging, which is different from the decision to 
hedge, where the most important determinants are firms‘ ability to hedge.   
In addition to the results which are consistent with previous literature, I also find that 
PastCom, which is the past commodity price growth is positively related to the extent of 
hedging. It suggests that, in general, firms tend to increase their hedge ratio when they 
observe an increase in commodity price in the previous period. Assuming there is only one 
optimal hedge ratio for firms with certain characteristics, the results suggest that firms adjust 
the hedge ratio based on their expectations of future commodity prices. It is consistent with 
the notion that firms may speculate when setting up the amount of hedging24.  
I also find that firms tend to hedge more when the industry average hedge ratio is 
higher. It indicates a spillover effect not only on the decisions to hedge, but also on the 
extent of hedging.  
Among all the determinants, past commodity price growth, the industry average hedge 
ratio and return of assets are the top three important characteristics, followed by young 
                                                 
24 See Adam and Fernando (2006) and Faulkender (2005) for further evidence on hedging and speculation.  
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CEO dummy and option compensation ratio. So, the results suggest that managerial risk 
preferences play an important role when setting up hedging policies on the extent of hedging, 
which is different from the decision to hedge, where the most important determinants are 
firms‘ ability to hedge.   
All independent variables are measured at t-1. Model (1)-(2) include year effects; Model 
(3)-(4) include industry and year effects and Model (5)-(6) include industry by year effects. 
All models report T-stats calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and 
clustered at the firm level.  
3.4.2     The extent of hedging and past commodity price growth 
If the hypothesis that firms with high risk appetite managers tend to hedge less is true, I 
should find the interaction term of past commodity price growth and young CEOs and the 
interaction term of past commodity price growth and option compensation ratio are 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand, it the hypothesis is true, I should also 
find the interaction terms of past commodity price growth and measures of firms‘ financial 
situations are not significantly different from zero.  
Table 3.2 reports the results for model 3.3 with the interaction term of past commodity 
price growth and firms‘ characteristics. I find that the firms with young CEOs and have 
higher option compensation ratio decrease their hedge ratios when they observe the past 
commodity price increases. Firms also tend to inversely respond to past commodity price 
growth when they are in competitive industries, though the coefficients are only significant 
at 10% confidence level. Younger CEOs usually are less risk averse compared to older 
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CEOs because they are in the early stage of their life cycles. The managers with higher 
option compensation prefer extra volatility of the cash flow and the stock price of the firms. 
So, their preferences for higher risk make them over confident and develop their hedge ratio 
according to their expectation to the future commodity prices, based on the past commodity 
price growth.  
It is noteworthy to mention that firms‘ financial constraint measures, leverage and debt 
rating and profitability do not affect whether firms deviate their hedge ratios according to 
the past commodity growth rate. The only significant characteristics that affect firms‘ hedge 
ratio deviation on the past commodity growth rate are the young CEO dummy and the 
option compensation ratio. It indicates that managerial risk preference is the main reason 
why firms deviates their hedge ratio according to past commodity price growth.  
3.4.3     The extent of hedging and industry average hedge ratio 
If the hypothesis that firms with high risk appetite managers hedge less and be 
overconfident is true, I should find the interaction term of and young CEOs and the 
interaction term of industry average hedge ratio and option compensation ratio are 
significantly less than zero. On the other hand, it the hypothesis is true, I should also find 
the interaction terms of past commodity price growth and measures of firms‘ financial 
situations are not significantly less than zero.  
Table 3.3 reports the results for model 3.3 with the interaction term of industry average 
hedge ratio and firms‘ characteristics. It shows that the firms with higher debt rating, young 
CEO and have higher option compensation ratio tend to be independent from the industry 
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average hedge ratio. Younger CEOs usually are less risk averse compared to older CEOs 
because they are in the early stage of their life cycles. The managers with higher option 
compensation prefer extra volatility of the cash flow and the stock price of the firms. So, 
their preferences for higher risk make them over confident and develop their hedge ratio 
different then their competitors.  
I also find that firms are more likely to follow the industry average hedge ratio when 
they are in concentrated industries. In concentrated industries, firms suffer more from 
predation risk from competitors and it shows in part II of my dissertation that firms who 
hedge less may suffer more from their competitors if they are in concentrated industries. So, 
the results showing that firms are more likely to follow the industry average hedge ratio 
when they are in concentrated industries are consistent with the competition arguments25.   
3.4.4     Industry specific results 
Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics of commodity growth rate and its autocorrelation 
and volatilities for different industries. Metal industries have the lowest commodity price 
growth rate, average of 8.4%, and highest autocorrelation, average of 0.146.  
Table 3.5 reports the results of Tobit regressions of hedge ratio for different industries. 
I use Tobit instead of Heckman model because a single industry does not have enough 
statistical power to conduct Heckman two-stage model. It shows that for airline industry 
                                                 
25 It is also consistent with the findings in Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) that firms tend to hedge more 
when they share similar investment opportunities with their competitors.  
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(two digit SIC 45) and other industries26, past commodity price growth, firm size and stock 
compensation ratio are positively associated with the extent of hedging. For metal industries 
(two digit SIC 33 and 34), past commodity price growth negatively affect the extent of 
hedging, while for petroleum refining industry (two digit SIC 29), past commodity price 
growth does not significantly affect the hedge ratio. Option compensation ratios are 
significant for all industries, except for airline industry.  
The results show that there exist a great amount of heteroskedasticity in industries and 
the industry effects are necessary to control for industry specific results. To distinguish firm 
effects from industry effects, firm fixed effect regressions on the extent of hedging are 
conducted industry by industry. The results are reported in Table 3.6. Firm fixed effect 
regressions show similar results to the Tobit regressions with lower statistical significance.  
 
3.5     Conclusions 
In this chapter, I investigate the factors that associate with the extent of corporate risk 
management. The data sample in my dissertation has advantages to overcome the concerns 
on using gross notional value as a measure of the extent of hedging. First, this chapter 
focuses on commodity hedging, which does not suffer the reporting problems mentioned in 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001). Second, my sample consists of commodity-input industries 
whose hedging activities are mainly on their input commodity exposures. These firms are 
                                                 
26 Other industries include textile industry (two digit SIC 22),  lumber industry (two digit SIC 24), furniture 




less likely to hold offsetting contracts for their commodity hedging. Therefore, the measures 
on the extent of hedging I use in my dissertation are less subject to overestimation bias. 
Third, because my sample consists of commodity-input industries, I can scale the gross 
notional value of the derivatives contracts by the cost of goods sold (COGS) to measure the 
percentage of commodity exposures being hedged directly. By contrast, the literature usually 
scales the gross notional value of the derivatives contracts by total assets, which does not 
directly capture the exposures of commodity price risk.    
I examine the hedging policies of 579 firms in 10 industry groups over the policies of 
579 firms in 10 industry groups over the period of 1994-2008. Specifically, I find that firms 
with younger CEOs and have more options in their compensation plans hedge less of their 
exposures. The results suggest that managerial risk preference play an important role in 
setting up the extent of hedging. The results are consistent with Tufano (1996), which 
analyzing the hedging activities in the gold mining industry in 1986.  
Furthermore, I find that the hedge ratio is positively correlated with the past commodity 
price growth rate. The firms with higher debt ratio, young CEO and higher option 
compensation are more likely to form their hedge ratios according to the past commodity 
price growth.  It suggests that firms may deviate from the optimal hedge ratio according to 
past commodity price growth and managers with higher risk appetite are more likely to 
deviate. I also find that firms‘ hedge ratio is higher when the average hedge ratio in industry 
is higher. It suggests that there is a spillover effect on the extent of hedging. The results are 
also consistent with the notion that competition in the product market affects corporate risk 
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management. Interestingly, I find that the firms with higher debt ratio, young CEO and 
higher option compensation are more likely to deviate from industry average hedge ratio.  It 
suggests that firms may deviate from the optimal hedge ratio in the cross-section from their 




Table 2.1   List of industry groups and summary of hedging policies  
The table lists the sample of industry groups at 2-digit SIC level in the paper. Number of firms is the average number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Herfindahl 
index is the sum of squared market share in 3-digit-SIC industry. Natural hedge is identified when a firm states in the filings that it uses long-term contracts 
with either supplier or consumers to fix the price for at least one year. Hedge ratio is either firms stated percentage of anticipated commodity usage hedged or 

































21 Tobacco Products  1 5.4 0.74 0.45 0.15 0.30 0.00 0.25 0.00 
22 Textile Mill Products  4 5.6 0.39 0.60 0.43 0.23 0.20 0.00 0.02 
24 
Lumber And Wood 
Products, Except Furniture  
3 8.0 0.39 0.20 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 
25 Funitures 4 5.8 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
26 Paper And Allied Products 5 23.0 0.26 0.38 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.00 0.08 
29 Petroleum Refining  2 17.1 0.33 0.66 0.20 0.21 0.49 0.00 0.03 
33 Primary Metal  1 14.8 0.39 0.45 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.02 0.00 
34 Fabricated Metal Products  6 7.4 0.38 0.44 0.24 0.25 0.09 0.06 0.01 
37 Transportation Equipment  7 17.9 0.50 0.46 0.27 0.39 0.08 0.00 0.00 
45 Transportation By Air  1 16.6 0.19 0.78 0.16 0.14 0.72 0.30 0.22 
 
          








Table 2.2   Summary statistics of firms grouped by hedging frequency 
The table shows the median values of the characteristics of firms grouped by hedging frequency. No Hedge are 
firms with zero hedge ratio. Minor hedge are firms with hedge ratio less than the industry median. Extensive hedge 
are firms with hedge ratio higher than industry median. Size is the market value at the end of each year. Age is 
the years since it first appears in CRSP. R&D expense is scaled by sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the 
capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. 
Long term debt is the long term debt scaled by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent 
investment divided by the total asset. Current ratio is current asset divided by current liability. KZ index is defined 
using Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo, (2001) formula. Operating profit margin is the gross income divided by total 
sales. ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. Q is the market value of equity plus book value 
of debt divided by the total assets. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-
SIC industry. Number of firms is the number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. The sample period is 1994-2008. 
The data is from Compustat. *** indicates 1% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level and * 
indicates 10% significance level.  
 
No hedge Minor hedge Extensive hedge 









Extensive hedge Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 





   Size (in millions) 3575.5 103.9 4165.8 1199.9 3338.0 689.1 -0.95 2.96 
Age (years) 16.4 12.0 31.2 30.5 22.6 18.0 -28.43 14.06 
Leverage  0.303 0.280 0.279 0.212 0.327 0.312 3.41 -7.02 
Long term debt  0.233 0.206 0.213 0.186 0.286 0.278 3.17 -11.65 
Cash holdings  0.062 0.026 0.070 0.044 0.080 0.045 -2.80 -3.08 
Current Ratio  2.352 1.985 2.098 2.043 1.553 1.213 6.03 17.50 
KZ Index 0.647 0.871 0.556 0.631 0.971 1.021 2.03 -11.88 
KZ Index without Q 
measure 
0.326 0.571 0.193 0.284 0.620 0.707 2.89 -11.87 
R&D expense  0.005 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 3.64 13.35 
Investment 0.066 0.046 0.051 0.038 0.088 0.070 8.57 -17.32 
Operation profit 
margin 
0.080 0.090 0.139 0.125 0.101 0.106 -16.93 12.41 
ROA 0.049 0.077 0.101 0.085 0.068 0.071 -11.61 10.04 
Q 1.451 1.147 1.364 1.322 1.270 1.145 3.03 4.89 
Sales growth 1.099 1.064 1.160 1.120 1.123 1.083 -6.25 4.16 
Herfindahl  0.235 0.160 0.295 0.195 0.132 0.091 -8.03 24.06 
Number of firms 21.0 18.0 16.5 10.0 27.2 30.0 8.83 -24.13 
Female CEO 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 5.18 -4.46 
CEO age under 45 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 13.72 -8.69 
CEO age above 60 0.303 0.000 0.556 1.000 0.285 0.000 -15.29 15.56 
CEO tenure 7.252 5.000 5.722 4.500 6.281 4.000 7.75 -2.73 
Option compensation 
ratio 
0.214 0.153 0.372 0.304 0.155 0.137 -7.46 5.68 
Stock compensation 
ratio 
0.028 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.065 0.000 -7.01 -2.53 
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Table 2.3    Pearson correlation of variables 
The table shows the Pearson correlation of variables. Size is the market value at the end of each year. Age is the years since it first appears in CRSP. 
R&D expense is scaled by sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is the book value of the 
total debt divided by the total asset. Long term debt is the long term debt scaled by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent 
investment divided by the total asset. Current ratio is current asset divided by current liability. KZ index is defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá-
Requejo, (2001) formula. Operating profit margin is the gross income divided by total sales. ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. Q is 
the market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by the total assets. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-
digit-SIC industry. Number of firms is the number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. The sample period is 1994-2008. 
 
  Size Age Leverage 
Debt 










ratio  Stock ratio 
Size (in 
millions) 1.00 
             
Age (years) 0.26 1.00 
            
Leverage  -0.19 -0.16 1.00 
           
Debt rating 0.36 0.47 -0.06 1.00 
          
Cash holdings  0.02 -0.08 -0.22 -0.10 1.00 
         
KZ Index -0.27 -0.29 0.76 -0.22 -0.14 1.00 
        
R&D expense  0.00 0.01 -0.14 0.06 -0.01 -0.13 1.00 
       
Investment 0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.17 1.00 
      
ROA 0.17 -0.01 -0.34 0.03 0.16 -0.33 0.02 0.13 1.00 
     
Herfindahl  -0.07 -0.11 0.03 -0.16 -0.04 0.00 0.33 -0.22 0.07 1.00 
    CEO age 
under 45 -0.05 -0.14 -0.01 -0.18 0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.16 -0.02 0.02 1.00 
   
CEO tenure -0.04 -0.13 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 0.04 -0.11 0.09 0.13 0.00 -0.06 1.00 
  Option 
compensation 
ratio 0.00 0.09 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.02 0.19 -0.07 -0.10 0.01 -0.04 1.00 
 Stock 
compensation 






Table 2.4    Transition Matrix of firms hedging policies 
The table shows the Transition Matrix of firms‘ hedging policies. Panel A and B report the average 
percentage of firms transit from Not Hedge (Hedge) at time t-1 to Not Hedge and Hedge at time t. 
In Panel A, hedge equals to 1 when firms conduct any type of hedge and in Panel B, hedge equals to 
1 when firms conduct commodity hedge. Panel C reports the average percentage of firms transit 
from No Hedge (Some Hedge or More Hedge) at time t-1 to No Hedge, Some Hedge and More 
Hedge at time t. No Hedge are firms with zero hedge ratio. Some hedge are firms with hedge ratio less than the 
industry median. More hedge are firms with hedge ratio higher than industry median.  The sample period is 
1994-2008.  
 
Panel A. Any type of hedge 
   Not Hedge t Hedge t 
 Not Hedge t-1 0.81 0.19 
 Hedge t-1 0.08 0.92 
 
    Panel B. Commodity Hedge 
   Not Hedge t Hedge t 
 Not Hedge t-1 0.90 0.10 
 Hedge t-1 0.09 0.91 
 
    Panel C. Commodity Hedge 
   No Hedge t Some Hedge t More Hedge t 
No Hedge t-1 0.90 0.03 0.07 
Some Hedge t-1 0.28 0.61 0.11 





Table 2.5   Decision of hedging  
The table shows Probit regressions of decisions on commodity hedging. OtherHe is dummy variable that equals 
to 1 when firms ever hedge other type of exposure in the past. # Hedgers in industry is percentage number of 
firms that hedge in the industry except firm itself. Rating is the index of debt rating, with 0 means no rating, 1 
means under C, 21 means AAA, etc. Other variables are defined in Table 2. All independent variables are 
measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of size 0.107*** 0.102** 0.141*** 0.101** 0.151*** 0.202*** 
 
(2.80) (2.43) (2.91) (2.08) (2.77) (3.21) 
Age -0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.009 
 











































































Cash holdings -0.427 -0.059 -0.241 -0.232 -0.292 -0.511 
 
(-1.61) (-1.09) (-1.45) (-1.27) (-1.36) (-1.50) 
Investment 0.274 0.301 0.092 0.182 0.512* 0.346 
 
(1.43) (1.52) (1.16) (1.30) (1.85) (1.50) 
HHI -0.638* -0.923** -0.885* -1.333** 
  
 
(-1.94) (-2.38) (-1.90) (-2.38) 
  Log of TLCF -0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.014 -0.003 -0.009 
 
(-0.19) (-0.42) (0.03) (-0.55) (-0.14) (-0.30) 

























Stock comp ratio 0.071 0.060* 0.036* 0.034* 0.052 0.052 
 
(1.30) (1.69) (1.86) (1.85) (1.60) (1.57) 
Option comp ratio -0.175* -0.177* -0.103* -0.108* -0.163* -0.161 
 
(-1.79) (-1.77) (-1.85) (-1.90) (-1.65) (-1.62) 
       Year Effect Y Y Y Y 
  Industry Effect 
  
Y Y 
  Year X Industry Effect 
    
Y Y 
Observations 3031 3012 2914 2894 2856 2835 
Pseudo R2 0.242 0.269 0.304 0.300 0.284 0.356 




Table 2.6   Regressions of hedging for the first time 
The table shows Probit regressions of hedging for the first time, where dependent variable is the dummy 
variable if firms hedge for the first time. # hedgers in industry is percentage number of firms hedge in the industry 
except firm itself. Other variables are defined in Table 2.  All independent variables are measured as changes at 
t-1 except for age, # hedgers in industry and Young CEO dummy. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the 
firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% 
significance level respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of size 0.018 0.021 -0.002 -0.010 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(1.37) (1.26) (-0.80) (-0.43) (-0.55) (-0.72) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.000* -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-1.40) (-1.20) (-1.84) (-1.55) (-1.27) (-0.68) 
# hedgers in industry 0.021 0.024 0.011 0.112 
  
 
(0.76) (0.83) (1.26) (1.29) 

























Debt rating 0.122*** 0.131*** 0.114** 0.125** 0.115*** 0.116*** 
 
(3.57) (3.56) (2.44) (2.38) (8.40) (8.23) 
Cash holdings -0.025 -0.030 0.016 0.075 -0.004 -0.007 
 
(-0.21) (-0.24) (0.70) (0.35) (-0.40) (-0.67) 
Investment 0.075 0.089 0.010 0.157 0.003 0.005 
 
(0.67) (0.74) (0.77) (1.33) (0.86) (1.24) 
ROA 0.632*** 0.677*** 0.427** 0.402** 0.574* 0.568* 
 
(3.55) (3.71) (2.10) (2.18) (1.86) (1.72) 
HHI 0.145** 0.157** 0.104** 0.163** 
  
 
(2.14) (2.17) (2.25) (2.29) 
  Log of TLCF -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.89) (-0.85) (0.33) (-0.50) (-0.91) (-0.83) 
Young CEO 0.053 0.055 0.027 0.253 -0.000 0.000 
 
(1.08) (1.07) (1.06) (1.35) (-0.08) (0.05) 
Stock comp ratio 0.029** 0.032** 0.033** 
   
 
(1.99) (2.16) (2.59) 
   Option comp ratio -0.025** -0.021** -0.024** -0.020** -0.014** -0.014** 
 
(-2.42) (-2.37) (-2.15) (-2.58) (-2.22) (-2.39) 
       Year Effect Y Y Y Y 
  Industry Effect 
  
Y Y 
  Year X Industry Effect 
    
Y Y 
Observations 3031 3012 2914 2894 2856 2835 
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.205 0.404 0.392 0.410 0.427 





Table 2.7   Decisions to hedge industry by industry 
The table shows Probit regressions of firms‘ hedge decisions. Independent variables are defined in Table 2 and 
3.  All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level 
and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.  ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance 
level respectively.  
 





Metals Others Others 
            
Log of size 0.161** 0.765** 0.108** 0.273*** 0.000*** 
 
(2.12) (1.99) (2.14) (3.33) (4.32) 
Age -0.003 0.095 0.002 -0.008 -0.000*** 
 
(-0.70) (1.59) (0.32) (-1.03) (-3.21) 
# hedgers in industry   13.608** 2.722*** 0.003*** 
 
  (2.39) (4.76) (4.50) 
Leverage 0.358 -0.856 0.327 -1.706*** -0.001*** 
 
(1.52) (-1.25) (0.53) (-3.05) (-4.41) 
Debt rating 0.012** 0.378** 0.008 0.301*** 0.258** 
 
(2.17) (2.01) (0.45) (3.10) (2.45) 
Cash holdings 0.276 -6.935* -1.146 -9.157*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.42) (-1.87) (-0.77) (-2.68) (-3.25) 
Investment 0.455 -0.992 2.094 -2.944 -0.005* 
 
(0.79) (-1.06.) (0.86) (-1.54) (-1.77) 
Log of TLCF -0.003 -0.407 0.002 0.035 -0.000 
 
(-0.10) (.) (0.07) (0.95) (-1.01) 
Young CEO -0.575**  -0.482 -0.285 -0.075 
 
(-2.06)  (-0.64) (-0.84) (-1.56) 
Stock comp ratio 1.701**  1.011 0.3581  
 
(2.15)  (1.05) (1.21)  
Option comp ratio -0.740** 0.546 -0.967 -0.609** -0.078* 
 
(-2.13) (1.26) (-1.07) (-2.38) (-1.66) 
      Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effect 
    
Y 





Table 3.1     Extent of hedging  
The table shows second stage Heckman selection regressions of firms‘ hedge ratio. PastCom is the commodity 
price growth rate at t-1. AveHe is the average hedge ratio in industry. Other variables are defined in Table 2.  All 
independent variables are measured at t-1.  All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and 
calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.  ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance 
level respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PastCom 0.511*** 0.456** 0.532** 0.479**   
 
(2.58) (2.25) (2.53) (2.22)   
AveHe 0.916*** 0.883*** 0.915*** 0.927*** 
  
 
(6.42) (6.06) (4.50) (4.62) 






















  Debt rating -0.004*  -0.003  -0.004 -0.005* 
 
(-1.69)  (-1.44)  (-1.58) (-1.68) 
Cash holdings -0.674* -0.738* -0.688* -0.782** -0.834** -0.832** 
 
(-1.72) (-1.93) (-1.75) (-2.07) (-1.98) (-2.02) 
HHI 0.245 0.149 0.296 0.344 
  
 
(0.70) (0.47) (0.61) (0.78) 
  Log of TLCF -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 -0.002 -0.009 -0.001 
 
(-0.82) (-0.48) (-0.58) (-0.17) (-0.52) (-0.03) 

























Stock comp ratio 0.060 0.073 0.052 0.060 -0.017 0.003 
 
(0.33) (0.42) (0.29) (0.35) (-0.08) (0.02) 
Option comp ratio -0.105** -0.124** -0.115** -0.141** -0.086** -0.092** 
 
(-2.30) (-2.25) (-2.01) (-1.99) (-2.42) (-2.47) 
Lambda -0.189** -0.168** -0.175* -0.150* -0.206** -0.210** 
 
(-2.16) (-2.06) (-1.87) (-1.90) (-2.18) (-2.15) 
Constant 0.193 -0.039 0.150 -0.139 0.747* -0.234 
 
(1.08) (-0.17) (0.56) (-0.47) (1.76) (-0.69) 
       Year Effect Y Y Y Y
  Industry Effect 
  
   Y    Y 
  Year X Industry 
Effect     
Y Y 








Table 3.2: Extent of hedging with interactions with past commodity price growth 
The table shows second stage Heckman selection regressions of firms‘ hedge ratio. Independent variables are 
defined in Table 2 and 3.  All independent variables are demeaned and measured at t-1. All models report T-
stats that are clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.  
***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PastCom 0.639*** 0.633*** 0.687*** 0.691*** 0.537*** 0.623** 
 
(2.73) (2.68) (2.86) (2.94) (2.60) (2.47) 
AveHe 0.896*** 0.880*** 0.920*** 0.917*** 0.935*** 0.952*** 
 
(6.51) (6.23) (5.19) (5.27) (4.75) (5.15) 
Leverage -0.167 -0.182 -0.150 -0.153 -0.060 -0.140 
PastCom * leverage 
(-0.77) (-0.82) (-0.67) (-0.70) (-0.23) (-0.66) 
-0.933    -1.093  
 (-1.35)    (-1.56)  
Debt rating -0.153** -0.150** -0.163** -0.160** -0.175** -0.145** 
 
(-2.00) (-2.02) (-2.18) (-2.27) (-2.08) (-2.15) 
PastCom * rating  -0.146 -0.111 -0.115  -0.106 
 (-0.67) (-0.52) (-0.56)  (-0.49) 
Cash holdings -0.816* -0.806* -0.856* -0.870** -0.768 -0.896** 
 
(-1.75) (-1.73) (-1.91) (-2.02) (-1.58) (-2.16) 
HHI 0.470 0.434 0.714 0.701 0.793 0.665 
 
(1.23) (1.14) (1.53) (1.56) (1.53) (1.44) 
PastCom * HHI -0.624* 
 
-0.751** -0.756** 
  (-1.92) 
 
(-2.15) (-2.18) 
  Log of TLCF -0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
 
(-0.33) (-0.24) (0.02) (0.02) (-0.12) (0.10) 
Young CEO -0.765 -0.684 -0.680 -0.697 -0.631 -0.700 
 
(-2.35) (-2.38) (-2.11) (-1.90) (-2.15) (-1.94) 










 Stock comp ratio 0.070 0.065 0.055 0.055 0.063 0.046 
 
(0.34) (0.31) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.25) 
Option comp ratio -0.048 -0.098 -0.062 -0.067 -0.071 -0.149 
 
(-0.28) (-0.55) (-0.38) (-0.43) (-0.39) (-0.92) 
PastCom * option comp 
 
-0.220 




   
(-0.63) 
lambda -0.266*** -0.272*** -0.252*** -0.249*** -0.285** -0.214** 
 
(-2.72) (-2.83) (-2.59) (-2.73) (-2.55) (-2.38) 
Constant 0.351* 0.368* 0.251 0.246 0.368 0.218 
 
(1.78) (1.84) (1.00) (1.00) (1.32) (0.89) 
      
Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effect 
  
Y Y Y Y 







Table 3.3 Extent of hedging with interactions of industry average hedge ratio 
The table shows second stage Heckman selection regressions of firms‘ hedge ratio and interaction terms of 
industry average hedge ratio (AveHe) and firms‘ characteristics. Independent variables are defined in Table 2 and 
3.  All independent variables are demeaned and measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at 
the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.  ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% 
significance level respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PastCom 0.553*** 0.510** 0.491** 0.531*** 0.486** 0.485** 
 
(2.67) (2.55) (2.47) (2.62) (2.40) (2.34) 
AveHe 0.855* 0.841** 0.761** 0.767** 0.740** 0.770*** 
 
(1.94) (2.16) (2.25) (2.10) (2.49) (2.29) 
Leverage -0.188 -0.239 -0.336 -0.190 -0.301 -0.187 
 
(-0.72) (-1.11) (-1.03) (-0.88) (-0.93) (-0.85) 
AveHe * Leverage 1.300  1.022  0.864  
(0.81)  (0.59)  (0.50)  
Debt rating -0.010 -0.007  -0.011  -0.011 
 (-1.20) (-1.06)  (-1.26)  (-1.32) 













Cash holdings -0.487 -0.652 -0.610 -0.708* -0.604 -0.696* 
 
(-0.96) (-1.61) (-1.44) (-1.78) (-1.43) (-1.72) 
HHI -0.097 0.251 -1.976 0.582 -0.009 0.788 
 
(-0.08) (0.65) (-0.91) (0.23) (-0.02) (1.25) 
AveHe * HHI -3.383*  -3.019* -3.290**   
 
(-1.69)  (-1.95) (-2.13)   
Log of TLCF -0.007 -0.011 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 
 
(-0.44) (-0.79) (-0.44) (-0.61) (-0.61) (-0.79) 
Young CEO -0.750* -0.758** -0.661* -0.663** -0.657* -0.651** 
 
(-1.83) (-2.43) (-1.69) (-2.47) (-1.71) (-2.37) 










 Stock comp ratio 0.039 0.058 0.046 0.050 0.055 0.057 
 
(0.17) (0.31) (0.24) (0.28) (0.29) (0.31) 
Option comp ratio -0.139** -0.110** -0.117** -0.106** -0.100** -0.109** 
(-2.21) (-2.05) (-2.41) (-2.48) (-2.64) (-2.05) 
AveHe * option comp 
 
-0.587* 




   
(-1.98) 
lambda -0.294** -0.221** -0.218** -0.188* -0.210** -0.206** 
 
(-2.00) (-2.30) (-2.05) (-1.93) (-1.98) (-2.00) 
Constant 0.453 0.356* 0.303 0.594 0.331 0.587 
 
(1.61) (1.86) (1.42) (1.50) (1.56) (1.57) 
 
      
Year Effect Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effect 
  
Y Y Y Y 




Table 3.4 Summary Statistics industry by industry 
The table shows summary statistics of firm and industry characteristics industry by industry. Volatility of 










          
Past commodity growth 0.146 0.134 0.084 0.150 
Size 1960.1 26414.5 1392.9 2858.3 
Leverage 0.312 0.265 0.288 0.325 
Cash holdings 0.115 0.045 0.050 0.075 
Option comp ratio 0.325 0.244 0.213 0.166 
     Volatility of PastCom 0.267 0.229 0.211 0.188 
Autocorrelation of PastCom 0.022 0.062 0.146 0.010 





Table 3.5 Extent of hedging industry by industry 
The table shows Tobit regressions of firms‘ hedge ratio. Independent variables are defined in Table 2 and 3.  
All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are clustered at the firm level and 
calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.  ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance 
level respectively.  
 






          
PastCom 0.222** 0.076 -0.830** 0.038** 
 
(1.98) (1.27) (-2.09) (2.11) 
Log of Size 0.083*** -0.014 0.037 0.131* 
 
(3.42) (-1.34) (1.66) (1.79) 
Leverage 0.539** -0.079 0.095 1.041 
 
(2.47) (-0.36) (0.42) (1.20) 
Cash holdings 0.483 0.122 -0.117 -3.787 
 
(1.25) (0.17) (-0.21) (-1.00) 
ROA -0.065 -0.353 -1.272** -3.236 
 
(-0.14) (-0.78) (-2.10) (-1.26) 







Option comp ratio -0.019 0.136* -0.357** -0.358*** 
 
(-0.14) (2.03) (-2.45) (-3.26) 
Constant -0.612*** 0.110 -0.117 -1.592** 
 
(-2.72) (0.82) (-0.77) (-2.43) 
     Year Effect Y Y Y Y 
Industry Effect 





Table 3.6 Extent of hedging industry by industry—firm fixed effect 
The table shows Firm fix effect regressions of firms‘ hedge ratio. Independent variables are defined 
in Table 2 and 3.  All independent variables are measured at t-1. All models report T-stats that are 
clustered at the firm level and calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors.  ***/**/* 
indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively.  
 
 






          
PastCom 0.148* 0.021** -0.013 0.037* 
 
(1.88) (1.98) (-0.11) (1.84) 
Log of Size 0.132*** 0.002 0.022 0.004 
 
(4.94) (0.27) (0.64) (0.22) 
Leverage 0.283 -0.051 0.068 0.090 
 
(1.41) (-0.55) (0.32) (0.51) 
Cash holdings 0.105 -0.150 0.034 -0.283 
 
(0.31) (-1.20) (0.05) (-0.58) 







Option comp ratio -0.205** -0.040* -0.052* -0.022* 
 
(-2.15) (-1.89) (-1.77) (-1.68) 
Constant -0.686*** 0.012 -0.127 0.010 
 
(-3.29) (0.16) (-0.49) (0.07) 
     Observations 488 539 2401 1031 









Part II Corporate Risk Management and 





Chapter 4  
Corporate Risk Management and Commodity 
Price Shocks 
 
4.1     Introduction 
In 2000, jet fuel prices increased by over 70%. During a three-year period beginning in 2000, 
United Airlines (UAL), which hedged less than 10% of its jet fuel exposure ex ante, 
experienced a 22.6% loss in market share and a 32% loss in relative profitability. By contrast, 
Southwest Airlines, which hedged 80% of its exposure, experienced a market share increase 
of 27% and an increase of 22% in relative profitability. Interestingly, Southwest Airlines also 
increased its advertising expenditure by 13% in 2000 and 2001. It indicates that Southwest 
takes advantage of the financial distress of United induced by its less hedged exposure in jet 
fuel and competes more aggressively for market share.      
This chapter studies the relationship between corporate hedging and product market 
competition and focuses on how firms with different hedging policies respond to 
unfavorable commodity shocks in the product market competition. Specifically, this chapter 
uses a broad sample of commodity-inputs industries to investigate whether a commodity 
shock has a long term effect on unhedged firms.  
Using a panel data of 579 firms (6276 observations) over the period of 1994-2008, I 




Specifically, I find that unhedged firms lose market share and profitability after negative 
commodity shocks. These effects are persistent for up to five years after the shock. I also 
find that when I condition the results on firms‘ ex ante financial constraints, unhedged and 
constrained firms lose the most of their market share and profitability. The effects are 
stronger in concentrated industries and industries with higher leverage dispersion. I adopt a 
difference-in-difference approach and shock indicators to control for the performance 
trends and use an instrumental variable methodology to address the potential endogeneity of 
hedging policies and financial constraints.    
The chapter directly relates to the recent literature that examines the strategic usage of 
corporate risk management.  Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) argue that a shock that 
reduces cash flows can render an unhedged firm unable to finance its investment 
opportunities, thus losing market share to rivals that hedged against this shock and can fund 
this investment internally. Similarly, Mello and Ruckes (2005) suggest that firms tend to 
hedge different risks from its competitors in order to gain in the product market competition 
in a favorable shock. Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2007) argue that firms‘ hedging choices 
depend on the hedging choices of their competitors. Several empirical papers provide 
evidence that firms consider product market competition when they make hedging decisions. 
Haushalter, Klasa and Maxwell (2007) study the S&P 500 manufacturing firms from 1993 to 
1997 and find that the derivatives usage and cash holdings are positively correlated with the 
interdependence of investment opportunities with rivals. Nain (2004) finds that a firm is 




Similarly, Adam and Nain (2008) find that there are fewer derivatives users in industries with 
higher competition. My dissertation is the first to provide direct evidence that ex ante 
hedging policies affect product market competition outcomes in a long term event study 
setting. My dissertation is also the first that studies commodity hedging in a multiple 
industries setting.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data used in 
this chapter. Section 4.3 describes the methodologies and presents the results. Section 4.4 
concludes the chapter.  
4.2     Data 
4.2.1     Hedging data 
The sample consists of manufacturing and the airline industries which have hedgeable 
commodities as significant inputs components. I identify industries with commodity inputs 
using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) benchmark input-output tables in 2002. I 
rank the percentage of commodity usage in each industry‘s total inputs, where commodities 
are defined as 30 hedgable commodities traded on the Chicago Merchandise Exchange, the 
Chicago Board of Trade and the New York Merchandise Exchange. I pick the top 10 two-
digit-SIC industries and exclude 3-digit-SIC industries with more than 200 firms considering 
the fact that predation is less likely to happen in highly competitive markets and the cost of 




The sample covers the period of 1994-2008 because SEC electronic data becomes 
available in 1994.  The sample consists of 976 firms and 31 three-digit-SIC industries. I 
exclude: (1) firms without 10-K or 10-Q forms in SEC EDGAR, (2) firms with less than 
three years of data after the commodity shock27, (3) firms with negative sales or asset data 
during the sample period, (4) industries with only one firm. After applying the above rules, I 
obtain the final sample of 579 firms, 6276 firm-year observations. I compare the 
characteristics of the final sample used in this paper, of all manufacturing firms and of all 
Compustat firms. The summary statistics of different samples are reported in Appendix B. 
The final sample used in the paper consists of more mature and larger firms, firms with 
lower R&D expenses, higher financial constraints and higher industry concentration.  
Hedging data are hand collected with keyword searching in 10-K forms from SEC 
EDGAR. The keywords used include: ―hedg‖, ―derivative‖, ―market risk‖ and ―raw 
material‖. Then the paragraph around the keywords is read to identify whether it is a hedge, 
what kind of hedge it is28, what kind of derivatives they use, the notional value and the fair 
value of the hedge if available. A natural hedge is identified when a firm states in the filings 
that it uses long-term contracts with either supplier or consumers to fix the price for at least 
one year29. Pass-throughs are not considered to be natural hedges unless there is a written 
contract of passing most of the input price increase to the customers. I exclude pass-through 
as an effective hedge because large increases in the input price are hard to pass-through to 
                                                 
27 I discuss the potential survival bias by restricting firms with five years data in section IV. Generally, including only firms 
who survive for three years after a shock underestimates the results of predation because the exiting firms are more likely to 
be the target of predation and those firms tend to be financially constrained and unhedged.     
28 I classify hedges into interest rate hedge, exchange rate hedge and commodity hedge.  




customers if there is competition in the industry. Refer to Appendix A for more details on 
hedging data.  
Other data sources are as following. Firm characteristics are from Compustat. Stock 
return data are from CRSP. Cotton prices are from the National Cotton Council of America. 
Lumber prices are from Random Length, a wood industry website. Crude oil, natural gas and 
jet fuel prices are from the Energy Information Administration. Metal price data are from 
Commodity Research Bureau, which collects data from the American Metal Market.  
4.2.2     Measures of financial constraints and hedging 
In the main analysis of chapter 4-6, firms are divided into four groups according to their 
financial constraints and hedging polices: Unconstrained Unhedged firms (UU), 
Unconstrained Hedged firms (UH), Constrained Unhedged firms (CU) and Constrained 
Hedged firms (CH). A firm is considered to be ―Hedged‖ if the firm‘s hedge ratio is greater 
than its industry average or if the firm uses natural hedges during the fiscal year. The hedge 
ratio is the total notional amount of derivatives divided by cost of goods sold (COGS) except 
for the Airline industry where all firms report notional amount of derivatives as a percentage 
of anticipated usage of a commodity. Refer to appendix A for details on the hedge ratio and 
the notional value of hedges.    
    Since the ex-ante financial constraint is an important variable in the analysis, several 
measures are adopted. (1) Leverage ratio is used to measure firms‘ ex ante financial constraints 
in the main analysis because it is the most straightforward measure and it captures the fact 




a debt overhang problem. Leverage is calculated as book value of the total debt divided by the 
total assets. Firms are considered to be constrained if they have a leverage ratio above the 
industry median, where the industry is defined at 3-digit SIC level. (2) The KZ index is 
another widely used measure for financial constraints. It gives the propensity of being 
financially constrained using five measurable firm characteristics—cash holdings, leverage, 
cash flow, dividend payment and Q. KZ index is calculated following Lamont, Polk, and Saá-
Requejo (2001) excluding the Q measure 30 . I exclude the Q measure from the formula 
because Q may measure investment opportunities and may bias my results. Firms are 
considered to be constrained if they have a KZ ratio above the industry median. (3) I also 
used the GSA index developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2009) using firm size, age and their 
quadratic forms31. Firms are considered to be constrained if they have a GSA index above 
the industry median. (4) The debt rating is also a measure of financial constraints. I consider a 
firm to be constrained if it has S&P debt rating below CCC or if it doesn‘t have a debt rating 
with non-zero debt outstanding. (5) A firm is considered to be constrained if it has 
pledgeable assets below its industry median, where pledgeable is defined as tangible asset 
minus book value of debt divided by total assets.  (6) The WW index32 is developed by 
Whited and Wu (2006) using GMM estimation of an investment Euler equation. Firms are 
considered to be constrained if they have the WW index above the industry median.   
                                                 
30 KZit  = -1.002CFit/Ait_1 -39.368DIVit/Ait_1 -1.315Cit/Ait_1 +3.139LEVit 
31 See Hadlock and Pierce (2009), table 6, column 7,  
GSAit  = -0.92SIZEit +0.06 SIZEit 2-0.071Ageit +0.001Ageit2 
32 See Whited and Wu (2006), page 543,  




The summary statistics of the characteristics of each of the four constrained and hedged 
groups are reported in Table 4.2. The financial constraint is measured by the leverage ratio. 
The results on other financial constraints measures are reported in Appendix D1. Consistent 
with the literature, financially constrained firms tend to be younger, smaller, with less R&D 
expenses and lower investment. They also have lower measures of profitability and the 
industry tend to be less concentrated. The hedged firms are bigger, older, have better 
performance and higher firm value. Among all the groups, the constrained unhedged group 
contains smallest and youngest firms with the worst performance measures.    
4.2.3     Shocks  
To study how ex ante hedging policies affect product market competition outcomes, I need 
exogenous shocks to the price of commodity inputs, which do not coincide with industry or 
economy boom. The variable Shock is defined as follows:  
       {
                                         
                                         
                                                                             
           (4.1) 
where    is the commodity price growth rate
33 at year t;     is the top 75th percentile of all 
commodity price growth rates and     is the 25th percentile of all commodity price growth 
rates.     is annual industry sales growth rate and       is the 75th percentile of all historical 
                                                 
33 When there are more than one underlying commodities, a commodity price index is developed and the 
growth rate is calculated for the index. The index is developed assuming all commodity inputs have the same 




industry sales growth rates.      is the real annual GDP growth rate and        is the 75th 
percentile of all real GDP growth rates.  
The unfavorable/negative shocks are defined as times when the commodity price 
growth is in the highest quintile, excluding times when either the industry sales growth or the 
GDP growth is in the top quintile. The conditions ensure that the unfavorable shocks do 
not coincide with industry or economy peaks so that the shocks have negative effects on 
firms‘ cash flow. The conditions also eliminate the cases when the commodity shocks are 
driven by increased demand. Summary statistics of the shocks are reported in Table 4.1b. 
During negative shocks, the average commodity prices increase by 25.1%, the industry sales 
increase by -0.7% and the GDP growth is 2.5%. By contrast, during normal times, 
commodity prices increase 7.6% on average, the industry sales growth is 7.7% and the GDP 
growth is 3.2%.  
When commodity prices increase (decrease) for consecutive years, only the first shock 
is counted.  When two consecutive shocks go the opposite directions, the stronger one is 
counted. The time series of selected commodity prices are shown in Figure 1.  
 
4.3     Methodology and results  
4.3.1     Basic results 
To investigate whether firms‘ hedging policies affect product market competition, it is 
natural to use a long term event study after negative shocks. First, the evidence shows that 




Second, hedging aims to reduce volatility of cash flows. The benefit of hedging should more 
likely be observed when there is a negative shock on hedgable cash flow. Third, a necessary 
condition for predation is that the target firm is financially constrained and that it does not 
have the funds to fight back the competition. The shocks described in the previous section 
ensure that financially constrained firms who do not hedge ex ante are less likely to obtain 
external financing while their internal cash flow is capped by increased commodity prices. 
Hedging can release the ex post financial constraints through two channels. First, hedged 
firms have better access to external financing. Hedged firms have relatively more stable cash 
flows, which makes them better candidates for external financing during negative shocks 
with limited funds available. This external financing channel is valid for any type of hedging 
as long as the hedging decreases the volatility of cash flows. Second, hedged firms may have 
higher internal cash flows relative to their competitors if the underlying exposure being 
hedged has an increased price. This internal fund channel only holds for commodity hedges.   
Because hedging policy may affect ex post financial constraints through the two 
channels argued above, firms with different ex ante hedging policies and financial constraints 
may have different product market competition outcomes during and after the negative 
shocks. The product market competition outcomes are measured by cumulative market 
share growth and cumulative ROA relative to its industry median, where market share is 
calculated as sales divided by the total sales of the three-digit-SIC industries. The results of 




As shown in Table 4.3 and Figure 3, after the negative commodity price shocks, 
financially constrained firms who do not hedge ex ante (group CU) lose 2% of their market 
share, and this loss of market share persists over the next three years. The unhedged 
constrained firms also experience 2.4% ROA decrease relative to their industry three years 
after negative shocks. On the contrary, unconstrained hedged (UH) firms gain market share 
of 10% and ROA of 2% relative to their industry.  
If the effects of commodity price shocks on firms with different hedging polices in the 
product market are symmetric, it is expected to observe that after positive commodity price 
shocks34, constrained hedged firms would experience loss in market share and profitability. 
However, as shown in Figure 4, after the positive commodity price shocks, financially 
constrained firms who hedge ex ante (group CH) do not lose significant portion of their 
market share or their return of assets. One possible explanation is that many firms use 
option type of derivative contracts as hedging instruments. That type of contracts give firms 
upside protection without losing the downside profitability when commodity input prices 
decrease.  
4.3.2     Difference-in-difference analysis 
The basic results could either be due to the predatory behaviors of the competitors or just 
because the constrained unhedged firms are poor performance firms who just continue to 
perform poorly after the shocks.   
                                                 




In order to distinguish whether the loss of market share growth and ROA for 
constrained unhedged firms is purely due to the performance trend, I conduct difference-in-
difference analysis in this section.  
Specifically, instead of examining the cumulative effect from time 0 to 2, I look at the 
difference between the cumulative effects of three years after the shocks and the cumulative 
effects of two years before the shocks. And then I compare the difference between different 
firm groups. The difference-in-difference results are reported in Table 4.4. The results do 
not change much from the basic analysis.  
 In order to control for other firm characteristics, I conduct an OLS regression of the 
difference-in-difference variables. It is important to know what characteristics determine 
firms‘ hedging polices and to include characteristics that might affect firm‘s responses to 
shocks into the regressions of difference-in-difference variables. The following models are 
estimated and the results are reported in Table 4.5.  
                                
        
                                (4.2) 
Where      is dummy hedged in model (1) and dummy of commodity hedge in model (2) 
shown in Table 4.5.        is a vector of variables that determines hedge and might affect the 
ex post difference-in-difference  measures. Variables included in vector       : log(size) is the 
log of market capitalization at the end of each year; long term debt is the book value of long 
term debt scaled by total assets; investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets; 




divided by total assets; Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investments divided by 
the total assets; R&D is R&D expenses scaled by sales; Q is the market value of equity plus 
book value of debt divided by the total assets; Herfindahl is the sum of squared market share 
of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-SIC industry.         is a vector of variables that determine 
hedges but can be reasonably argued not to affect the ex post difference-in-difference 
measures. Those exogenous variables will be used as instruments in section III.D.  Variables 
included in vector       : Young_CEO is an indicator variable of CEO‘s age less than 45; 
Stock compensation percentage is the total value of executives‘ stock compensation divided by 
total compensation; options compensation percentage is the total value of executives‘ options 
compensation divided by total compensation.   
As shown in Table 4.5, columns (1) and (2), determinants for any hedge and commodity 
hedge are different. The probability of firms having any types of hedges increases with the 
firm size and the stock compensation ratio; it decreases with the investment, the Herfindahl 
and the young CEO indicator. By contrast, the probability of firms hedging commodity 
exposure increases with size, investment and cash holdings; it decreases with R&D expenses 
and the Q measure.  
With vector        as control variables, I regress the difference-in-difference market 
share growth and the relative ROA on group dummies—UH, CU and CH and interactions 
of the dummy CU and measures of industry competition. The results are shown in Table 4.6.  




growth and relative ROA controlling for firm characteristics. The results are stronger in 
more concentrated industries and industries with higher range of leverage.  
 
4.3.3     Whole sample with shock indicators   
Another way to control for possible performance trends is to model the market share 
growth and the relative ROA use the whole sample and to estimate interaction effect of 
group dummies and shock indicators. If the coefficients on the interaction terms are 
significant, it means that constrained unhedged firms affect market share growth and ROA 
more during and after the shocks than the potential performance trend.  
The results are shown in Table 4.7.  The dependent variables are market share growth at 
time t in column (1), cumulative market share growth for t and t+1 in column (2), 
cumulative market share growth for t to t+2 in columns (3)-(5), and cumulative relative 
ROA for t to t+2 in columns (6)-(7). The results show that constrained unhedged (CU) firms 
experience a negative trend of market share growth, but during and after negative shocks, 
they lose more in terms of market share and relative ROA. Furthermore, constrained 
unhedged (CU) firms lose more market share in concentrated industries and industries with 





4.3.3     Treatment effect model with instruments   
The previous two subsections control for the potential performance trends. However, 
endogeneity is still a concern if unobserved firm characteristics affect both whether firms 
hedge commodity exposure and how firms respond to a negative shock. To mitigate the 
potential endogeneity, I use variables that affect firms‘ hedging polices and financial 
constraints, but that can be reasonably argued not to affect how firms respond to shocks.  
The instruments are LTLCF, Young_CEO, Stock compensation ratio and options compensation 
ratio, where LTLCF is the log of 1 plus Tax Loss Carry Forward, which measures the 
convexity of firms‘ tax function. The argument is that the more convex the firm‘s tax 
function is, the more likely the firm is to hedge. Young_CEO is the dummy variable that 
equals to one when the age of CEO at time t is less than 45. Young CEO are less likely to 
hedge because they are relatively risk averse. Stock compensation ratio is value of stock 
compensation divided by total compensation. Option Compensation ratio is the value of options 
compensation divided by total compensation. Executives with higher stock compensation 
prefer stable stock prices; therefore they are more likely to hedge. On the contrary, 
executives with higher option compensation like volatility, so they are less likely to hedge. In 
the first stage, I adopt a Multinomial Logit model and use the instruments and regular 
controls to predict probabilities of different outcomes for a group variable, which has 
outcomes of UU, UH, CU and CH. The first stage results are reported in Table 4.5, column 
(3)-(5) with UU as the base outcome. The predicted probabilities of different outcomes are 




according to the highest probability of outcomes. The predicted variables of UU, UH, CU 
and CH are then used in the second stage regressions. The results at the first stage is 
consistent with Tufano (1997) and Haushalter (2000)  
The results of the second stage regressions are reported in Table 4.8. Columns (1)-(3) 
report regressions of difference-in-difference  market share growth and ROA for t to t+2 
and columns (4)-(7) report regressions of market share growth and ROA for the whole 
sample with interactions of negative shocks indicators. In both models, results are similar to 
the basic results.     
4.4     Conclusions 
This chapter studies the relationship between corporate hedging and product market 
competition and focuses on how firms with different hedging policies respond to 
unfavorable commodity shocks in the product market competition. Specifically, this chapter 
uses a broad sample of commodity-inputs industries to investigate whether a commodity 
shock has a long term effect on unhedged firms.  
Using a panel data of 579 firms (6276 observations) over the period of 1994-2008, I 
find evidence that firms‘ hedging policies affect product market competition outcomes. 
Specifically, I find that unhedged firms lose market share and profitability after negative 
commodity shocks. These effects are persistent for up to five years after the shock. I also 
find that when I condition the results on firms‘ ex ante financial constraints, unhedged and 




stronger in concentrated industries and industries with higher leverage dispersion. I adopt a 
difference-in-difference approach and shock indicators to control for the performance 
trends and use an instrumental variable methodology to address the potential endogeneity of 









Chapter 5  
Corporate Risk Management and Product 
Market Competition 
 
5.1     Introduction 
Chapter 4 studies the relationship between corporate hedging and product market 
competition and focuses on how firms with different hedging policies respond to 
unfavorable commodity shocks in the product market competition. Specifically, I find that 
unhedged firms lose market share and profitability after negative commodity shocks. These 
effects are persistent for up to five years after the shock. I also find that when I condition 
the results on firms‘ ex ante financial constraints, unhedged and constrained firms lose the 
most of their market share and profitability.  
The observed market share loss of constrained unhedged firms following negative 
shocks can be explained by three hypotheses35. First, the market share loss of constrained 
unhedged firms is due to the firm‘s own decision. Constrained unhedged firms may choose 
to cut back sales or advertising in the short term and intend to regain the market share and 
profitability in the longer term. This hypothesis is rejected because the evidence in the paper 
shows that constrained unhedged firms do not gain back market share and profitability up to 
five years after the shocks. Second, the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms can 
be consumer driven. Consumers choose to leave constrained unhedged firms because they 
                                                 




worry about the product quality or the continuation of future services. Third, the market 
share loss of constrained unhedged firms can be competitor driven. Competitors with 
financial advantages have the incentives to compete more aggressively to gain more market 
share or to drive the unhedged firms out of the market.36  
In this chapter, I investigate to what extent the loss of market share of constrained 
unhedged firms is driven by their competitors or their consumers. If the loss of market share 
of constrained unhedged firms is driven by their consumers, constrained unhedged firms 
should lose more market share if they have higher product differentiation. I find weak 
evidence that the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms is stronger in industries 
with higher product differentiation. If the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms is 
competitor driven, it should be observed that competitors with financial advantages compete 
more aggressively during the negative commodity price shocks and gain market in the long 
term.  The results in this chapter show that the market share loss of constrained unhedged 
firms is stronger in concentrated industries and industries with higher leverage dispersion. It 
also shows that firms with financial advantages—unconstrained hedged firms—tend to 
increase advertising expenditures and decrease price-cost-margins during negative 
commodity shocks, indicating that the negative effects that constrained unhedged firms 
experience are due to increased competition in the product market.  
                                                 
36 Based on theories of predation, see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), John McGee (1958), Lester Telser (1966),  Jean-Pierre 




The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data used in 
this chapter. Section 5.3 describes the methodologies and presents the results. Section 5.4 
concludes the chapter.  
 
5.2     Data 
The sample consists of manufacturing and the airline industries which have hedgeable 
commodities as significant inputs components. Chapter 4.2 describes the data in detail. The 
list of two-digit-SIC industries is reported in Table 4.1. 
The final sample covers the period of 1994-2008 and consists of 579 firms, 31 three-
digit-SIC industries and 6276 firm-year observations. I compare the characteristics of the 
final sample used in this paper, of all manufacturing firms and of all Compustat firms. The 
summary statistics of different samples are reported in Appendix B.  
Hedging data are hand collected with keyword searching in 10-K forms from SEC 
EDGAR. Refer to Appendix A for more details on hedging data.  
Other data sources are as following. Firm characteristics are from Compustat. Stock 
return data are from CRSP. Cotton prices are from the National Cotton Council of America. 
Lumber prices are from Random Length, a wood industry website. Crude oil, natural gas and 
jet fuel prices are from the Energy Information Administration. Metal price data are from 




In the main analysis of chapter 4-6, firms are divided into four groups according to their 
financial constraints and hedging polices: Unconstrained Unhedged firms (UU), 
Unconstrained Hedged firms (UH), Constrained Unhedged firms (CU) and Constrained 
Hedged firms (CH). A firm is considered to be ―Hedged‖ if the firm‘s hedge ratio is greater 
than its industry average or if the firm uses natural hedges during the fiscal year. The hedge 
ratio is the total notional amount of derivatives divided by cost of goods sold (COGS) except 
for the Airline industry where all firms report notional amount of derivatives as a percentage 
of anticipated usage of a commodity. Refer to appendix A for details on the hedge ratio and 
the notional value of hedges. The summary statistics of the characteristics of each of the four 
constrained and hedged groups are reported in Table 4.2. The financial constraint is 
measured by the leverage ratio. Consistent with the literature, financially constrained firms 
tend to be younger, smaller, with less R&D expenses and lower investment. They also have 
lower measures of profitability and the industry tend to be less concentrated. The hedged 
firms are bigger, older, have better performance and higher firm value. Among all the groups, 
the constrained unhedged group contains smallest and youngest firms with the worst 
performance measures.     
The unfavorable/negative shocks are defined as times when the commodity price 
growth is in the highest quintile, excluding times when either the industry sales growth or the 
GDP growth is in the top quintile. The conditions ensure that the unfavorable shocks do 
not coincide with industry or economy peaks so that the shocks have negative effects on 




driven by increased demand. Summary statistics of the shocks are reported in Table 4.1b. 
The time series of selected commodity prices are shown in Figure 1.  
 
5.3     Methodology and Results 
As Opler and Titman (1994) point out, financially distressed firms lose market share during 
industry downturns. The loss of market share can be manager-induced, customer-induced or 
competitor-induced. If the loss is due to manager adjusting output level temporarily in 
response to the increased costs, we don‘t expect to see loss in the profitability or the effect 
of market share loss shouldn‘t be persistent. So, the loss of market share for constrained 
unhedged firms is not driven by managers. If the loss is because customers abandon 
financially distressed firms, we expect to see that the loss of market share is more significant 
for firms with more unique products. If the loss is competitor-induced, we should see that 
the effect is more significant in concentrated industries and firms that compete more 
aggressively should gain more market share.  
5.3.1   Competition  
As shown in previous tests, constrained unhedged (CU) firms lose market share during and 
after unfavorable commodity shocks and the loss is more significant in concentrated 
industries and industries with higher leverage dispersion. But do competitors with financial 
advantages—unconstrained hedged (UH) firms compete more aggressively by increasing 
advertising or decreasing prices? In this section, I assess whether different firms have 




I use two measures of active competition. One is the advertising growth rate, defined as: 
                        
    
      
                                                   (5.1) 
Where      is the advertising expenses divided by sales at time t. The results are 
reported in Table 9, columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6), where column (2) uses 
           
        
   as 
the dependent variable. In columns (1) and (2), t includes only periods with negative shocks. 
In columns (5) and (6), t includes all time periods. The results show that firms with financial 
advantages (UH group) tend to increase their advertising expenses at the time of negative 
shocks and the effect is much stronger in more concentrated industries.    
The other active competition measure is the change in the Price-Cost-Margin: 
             
 
 
                                                   (5.2) 
Where     is the Price-Cost-Margin defined as 
            
      
.  
The results of regressions of PCMC are reported in Table 9 columns (3), (4) and (7). In 
columns (3) and (4), t includes only negative shocks. In column (7), t includes all time 
periods. The results show that firms with financial advantages (UH firms) tend to decrease 
their PCM at the time of negative shocks. The effects are weakly stronger in more 




The results in this section suggest that firms with relative financial advantages (UH 
firms) actively increase their competition during negative shocks and gain market share and 
more profitability in the long term.    
5.3.2   Product differentiation  
If the loss of market share of constrained unhedged (CU) firms is because customers 
abandon financially distressed firms, we expect the loss of market share to be more 
significant for firms with unique products. In this section, I test the hypothesis that the 
market share loss of CU firms is more significant in industries with more product 
differentiation, where product differentiation is measured using the following three variables.  
The first measure is the R&D expense ratio, as adopted in Opler and Titman (1994). 
The results are shown in Table 9b, columns (1) and (4). The interaction term of the R&D 
expense and the CU dummy is not statistically significant in the regression of market share 
growth. It indicates there is no evidence that the market share loss of constrained unhedged 
(CU) firms is consumer driven.  
The second measure of product differentiation is the Pre-shock PCM difference, 
defined as: 
Pre-shock PCM difference= 
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where         is the industry median of the Price-Cost-Margin. The Pre-shock PCM 
difference is a firm level measure. It measures how firm‘s PCM is different from its industry 




industry. The results are reported in Table 9b, column (2) and (5). The interaction term of 
Pre-shock PCM difference and CU dummy is not significant in the regression of market share 
growth. It indicates there is no evidence that the market share loss of constrained unhedged 
(CU) firms is consumer driven.  
The third measure is Pre-shock PCM dispersion, defined as: 
Pre-shock PCM dispersion = 
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                                        (5.4) 
Where          is the standard deviation of the Price-Cost-Margin in the industry. 
The Pre-shock PCM dispersion is an industry level measure. It measures the dispersion of PCM 
within an industry. The higher the measure is, the more product differentiation the industry 
has. The results are shown in Table 9b, columns (3) and (6). The interaction term of Pre-shock 
PCM dispersion and CU dummy is positive and significant, indicating that the market share 
loss of constrained unhedged (CU) firms could be consumer driven.  
The results in this section show that one out of three measures of product 
differentiation can significantly explain the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms. 
It suggests that there is weak evidence that the market share loss is customer driven.  
 
5.4     Conclusions 
In Chapter 4 I find that unhedged firms lose market share and profitability after 




I also find that when I condition the results on firms‘ ex ante financial constraints, unhedged 
and constrained firms lose the most of their market share and profitability.  
The observed market share loss of constrained unhedged firms following negative 
shocks can be explained by three hypotheses. First, the market share loss of constrained 
unhedged firms is due to the firm‘s own decision. This hypothesis is rejected because the 
evidence in the paper shows that constrained unhedged firms do not gain back market share 
and profitability up to five years after the shocks. Second, the market share loss of 
constrained unhedged firms can be consumer driven. Consumers choose to leave 
constrained unhedged firms because they worry about the product quality or the 
continuation of future services. Third, the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms 
can be competitor driven. Competitors with financial advantages have the incentives to 
compete more aggressively to gain more market share or to drive the unhedged firms out of 
the market.37  
In this chapter, I investigate to what extent the loss of market share of constrained 
unhedged firms is driven by their competitors or their consumers. I find weak evidence that 
the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms is stronger in industries with higher 
product differentiation. However, I do find evidence supporting the hypothesis that the loss 
of market share of constrained unhedged firms is driven by their competitors. The results in 
this chapter show that the market share loss of constrained unhedged firms is stronger in 
concentrated industries and industries with higher leverage dispersion. It also shows that 
                                                 
37 Based on theories of predation, see Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), John McGee (1958), Lester Telser (1966),  Jean-Pierre 




firms with financial advantages—unconstrained hedged firms—tend to increase advertising 
expenditures and decrease price-cost-margins during negative commodity shocks, indicating 
that the negative effects that constrained unhedged firms experience are due to increased 





Chapter 6  
Corporate Risk Management and the 
“Exiting" Firms  
 
6.1     Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I examine how firms with different hedging policies respond to 
unfavorable commodity shocks in the product market competition. I find that constrained 
unhedged firms lose market share and profitability for up to five years after negative 
commodity shocks. When conducting the analysis, I exclude firms with less than three years 
of data after the shocks because the market share growth ratio suffers survival bias.  
In the extreme case of product market competition, financially weak firms are driven 
out of market. Therefore, if unhedged firms suffer from market share and profitability loss 
after unfavorable shocks, they should also have high probability of exiting the market as 
their market share decrease to zero.    
In this chapter, I analyze the firms who ―exit‖ the sample during the sample period and 
what firms and industry characteristics determine the exit. I use the last data year when the 
firm is in the Compustat database (excluding 2008) as a crude measure of the exit time.  I 
find that constrained unhedged firms are 6% more likely to exit the market than their hedged 
rivals and the effects are more significant in concentrated industries and industries with 




which mainly consists of bankruptcy and delisting for non-merger reasons. The results are 
consistent with the notion that corporate hedging protects firms from bankruptcy and 
exiting the market.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the data used in 
this chapter. Section 6.3 describes the methodologies and presents the results. Section 6.4 
concludes the chapter.  
6.2     Data 
The sample consists of manufacturing and the airline industries which have hedgeable 
commodities as significant inputs components. Chapter 4.2 describes the data in detail. The 
list of two-digit-SIC industries is reported in Table 4.1. 
The final sample covers the period of 1994-2008 and consists of 579 firms, 31 three-
digit-SIC industries and 6276 firm-year observations. I compare the characteristics of the 
final sample used in this paper, of all manufacturing firms and of all Compustat firms. The 
summary statistics of different samples are reported in Appendix B.  
Hedging data are hand collected with keyword searching in 10-K forms from SEC 
EDGAR. Refer to Appendix A for more details on hedging data.  
In the main analysis of chapter 4-6, firms are divided into four groups according to their 
financial constraints and hedging polices: Unconstrained Unhedged firms (UU), 
Unconstrained Hedged firms (UH), Constrained Unhedged firms (CU) and Constrained 




than its industry average or if the firm uses natural hedges during the fiscal year. The hedge 
ratio is the total notional amount of derivatives divided by cost of goods sold (COGS) except 
for the Airline industry where all firms report notional amount of derivatives as a percentage 
of anticipated usage of a commodity. Refer to appendix A for details on the hedge ratio and 
the notional value of hedges. 
I use the last data year when the firm is in the Compustat database (excluding 2008) as a 
crude measure of the exit time. The summary statistics for exit and remaining firms are 
reported in Table 6.1. Compared to surviving firms, the exiting firms are less likely to hedge, 
tend to be smaller, have a higher leverage and a higher KZ index. This indicates that the 
firms that exit the sample are more likely to be in the unhedged and financially constrained 
group. These firms also have a ROA of -5.2% on average and sales growth significantly 
lower than the surviving firms. The exit firms are more likely to be in an industry with a 
lower Herfindahl index and lower number of firms.  The results show that the firms who 
disappear tend to be unhedged and distressed. This evidence indicates that they have the 
worst consequence in product market competition—being driven out of the market.  
 
6.3     Methodology and results 
Table 6.2 reports the results of regressions of firms‘ exit. Columns (1)-(3) report Probit 
regressions where the dependent variables are dummies of ―exit‖ and the independent 




errors of interaction terms are adjusted using Ai and Norton (2003) methods. As shown in 
Table 6.2, regression (1), constrained unhedged firms (CU) are 6% more likely to exit the 
market than its unconstrained hedged rivals (UH).   
In order to test whether the constrained unhedged firms exiting the market are due to 
product market competition, I employ the interaction term of measures of industry 
competition with the group dummy of CU. As shown in Table 6.2, column (2) and (3), 
constrained unhedged firms (CU) are more likely to exit the market in concentrated 
industries, measured by higher a Herfindahl ratio, and in industries with higher range of 
leverage.  
Column (4) and (5) in table 6.2 report the results from Cox-Hazard regressions. They 
show that constrained unhedged (CU) firms have higher hazard rates and the results are 
stronger in more concentrated industries and in industries with higher range of leverage.  
Column (6) and (7) report Multinomial Logit regressions of a dependent variable with 
outcomes of merger exit, other exit and not exit, where not exit is the base outcome. The 
results show that constrained unhedged (CU) firms are more likely to exit in other types‘ of 
exit, but not as a merger exit.   
There are about 24 firms that exit from the sample every year, given the fact that the 
exiting firms have lower sales growth and market share, higher constraints measures and 
lower probability to hedge before they exit, my results would be stronger if I can somehow 




exist all the time during a five years event window and ignoring the firms exited 
underestimates the results on predation, but it is a relative conservative method to control 
the potential survival bias when measuring the market share.      
 
6.4   Conclusions 
 This paper investigates the relationship between corporate hedging and product market 
competition. The paper examines how firms with different hedging police respond to 
unfavorable commodity shocks and whether competition affects firms‘ hedging polices.      
Using a broad sample of 7 industry groups with hedgeable commodities as their 
significant inputs in 1994-2008, I find evidence that firms‘ hedging policies affect product 
market competition and that firms do use hedging policy strategically. Specifically, I find that 
unhedged firms who are ex ante financially constrained lose market share and experience 
decreased ROA after negative commodity shocks. The effects are persistent up to five years 
after the shock and robust to potential trend and endogeneity. I find supportive evidence 
that competitors with financial advantages increase their advertising expenses and decrease 
their price-cost-margins during negative shocks. It suggests that the negative effects that 
unhedged constrained firms experience are due to actively increased competition in the 
product market.  Furthermore, I find that constrained unhedged firms are 6% more likely to 
exit the market than their unconstrained hedged rivals and that the effects are stronger in 
highly concentrated industries and industries with higher leverage dispersion. The paper also 




significantly negative stock returns. However, I do not find a difference between hedged and 
unhedged firms during positive commodity shocks, suggesting an asymmetric effect of 
positive and negative commodity shocks on corporate hedging. In general, firms are more 
likely to hedge and have a higher hedge ratio in more concentrated industries and high 
leverage dispersion industries, suggesting that product market competition is an important 
consideration when firms make their hedging decisions.  
In summary, the paper finds evidence that firms use hedging policies strategically in 
product market competition. Hedging helps firms reduce the predation risk during and after 
negative shocks. Firms with financial advantages tend to use hedging policies to gain market 
share from their distressed competitors. Product market competition is an important 





Table 4.1   List of industry groups and summary of hedging policies  
The table lists the sample of industry groups at 2-digit SIC level in the paper. Number of firms is the average number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Herfindahl 
index is the sum of squared market share in 3-digit-SIC industry. Natural hedge is identified when a firm states in the filings that it uses long-term contracts 
with either supplier or consumers to fix the price for at least one year. Hedge ratio is either firms stated percentage of anticipated commodity usage hedged or 
the stated notional dollar amount divided by Cost of Goods Sold (COGS). The sample period is 1994-2008.  
Industr
y group 



























22 Textile Mill Products  4 5.6 0.39 Cotton, Energy 0.60 0.20 0.00 0.16 
24 Lumber And Wood 
Products 
3 8.0 0.39 Lumber 0.20 0.05 0.00 0.03 
26 Paper And Allied Products  5 23.0 0.26 Lumber, Energy 0.38 0.29 0.00 0.08 
29 Petroleum Refining  2 17.1 0.33 Crude Oil and Natural 
gas 
0.67 0.51 0.00 0.12 
33 Primary Metal  1 14.8 0.39 Aluminum, Copper, 
Nickel and Natural Gas 
0.46 0.26 0.02 0.33 
34 Fabricated Metal Products  6 7.4 0.38 Aluminum, Copper,  
Zinc and Natural Gas 
0.44 0.09 0.06 0.20 
37 Transportation Equipment  7 17.9 0.50  0.47 0.09 0.00 0.02 
45 Transportation By Air  1 16.6 0.19 Jet Fuel 0.78 0.71 0.26 0.32 
  
        
Averag
e  
3.3 12.9 0.4 
 








Table 4.2   Summary statistics of commodity price shocks  
The table shows the average commodity price growth rate, the industry sales growth rate and the real GDP 
growth rate during negative shocks, positive shocks and normal times. The unfavorable/negative shocks are 
times when commodity price growth is in the highest quintile, excluding times when either industry sales 
growth or GDP growth is in the top quintile. See section II.C for details on the definition of shocks. Commodity 
index growth is the average annual commodity price index growth rate, assuming firms use exposed commodities 
at equal weight. Industry sales growth is the annual industry sales growth in the sample, where industry is defined 
at three-digit SIC level. The sample period is 1994-2008.  








Commodity index growth 0.251 -0.046 0.076 
Industry sales growth -0.007 0.053 0.077 
Real GDP growth 0.025 0.030 0.032 









Commodity index growth 0.287 -0.069 0.082 
Industry sales growth 0.055 0.057 0.071 




Table 4.3   
Summary statistics of the characteristics of firms grouped by financial constraint and 
hedging policies 
The table shows the mean values of the characteristics of constrained and unconstrained, hedged and unhedged 
firms. Financial constrained firms are identified as with leverage ratio higher than its industry median. The firm 
is considered to be ―hedged‖ if it uses financial derivative or natural hedge to hedge exposure in commodity or 
exchange rate during the fiscal year.   Size is the market value at the end of each year. Age is the years since it 
first appears in CRSP. R&D expense is scaled by sales and shown in percentage. Investment is the capital 
expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. Long 
term debt is the long term debt scaled by the total asset. Cash holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investment 
divided by the total asset. Current ratio is current asset divided by current liability. KZ index is defined using 
Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo, (2001) formula. Operating profit margin is the gross income divided by total sales. 
ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. Q is the market value of equity plus book value of debt 
divided by the total assets. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-SIC 
industry. Number of firms is the number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. The sample period is 1994-2008. The 
data is from Compustat. *** indicates 1% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level and * indicates 
10% significance level.  
  
Constrained firms  Unconstrained firms 
Hedged Unhedged 
T-stat of 
difference  Hedged Unhedged 
T-stat of 
difference 
N  1224 1710   1107 2106  
General firm characteristics        
Size (in millions) 3983.5 1938.3  4.80***  8308.3 5917.6  2.35** 
Age (years) 23.0 16.0  11.66***  31.6 20.7  17.70*** 
R&D expense  0.014 0.026 -10.52***  0.016 0.019 -2.34** 
Investment 0.063 0.058   2.35**  0.073 0.064  5.17*** 
Financial condition measures        
Leverage  0.432 0.450 -2.85***  0.202 0.152  11.69*** 
Long term debt  0.375 0.332   6.11***  0.164 0.118  11.69*** 
Cash holdings  0.043 0.042   0.59  0.058 0.067 -3.08*** 
Current Ratio  1.674 1.780 -3.19***  1.772 2.709 -19.59*** 
KZ Index 1.186 1.354 -5.95***  0.280 0.295 -0.50 
KZ Index without Q measure 0.932 1.115 -5.79***  -0.061 -0.033 -0.96 
Performance measures        
Operation profit margin 0.119 0.085  10.97***  0.126 0.088  12.62*** 
ROA 0.084 0.056  8.62***  0.095 0.069  6.48*** 
Q 1.284 1.183  5.20***  1.424 1.384  1.35 
Sales growth 1.151 1.121  3.07***  1.145 1.077  8.35*** 
Industry competition measures        
Herfindahl index  0.229 0.244 -2.56**  0.246 0.271 -3.27*** 




Table 4.4  
Cumulative effects of negative shocks on market share and relative ROA 
The table shows the cumulative effects of negative shocks on market share, percentage of market share and 
profitability measured by relative ROA for constrained and unconstrained, hedged and unhedged firm groups. 
The table includes only firms existing for all the time between year 0 and year 3 to mitigate the survival bias 
problem. Financial constrained group are defined using leverage ratio higher its industry median. The firm is 
considered to be ―hedged‖ if it has hedge ratio greater than industry average. Market share is calculated by the 
sales divided by the total sales of the three-digit-SIC industries. ROA is calculated as EBIT divided by total 
assets adjusted by industry median ROA at the 3-digit-SIC level.  *** indicates 1% significance level, ** 
indicates 5% significance level and * indicates 10% significance level. 
 
  
Constrained firms T-stat of 
difference 
Unconstrained firms T-stat of 
difference Hedged Unhedged Hedged Unhedged 
Cumulative market share change 
     Year 1 0.000 -0.003 1.975* 0.002 0.001 0.223 
Year 2 0.011 -0.004 2.798*** 0.006 -0.001 1.601 
Year 3 0.011 -0.004 2.766*** 0.006 -0.002 1.493 
       Cumulative percentage market share change 
   Year 1 0.005 -0.022 1.548 0.043 0.013 1.203 
Year 2 0.029 -0.024 2.688*** 0.081 0.020 1.813 
Year 3 0.029 -0.022 2.308** 0.106 0.017 1.974** 
       Cumulative relative ROA change 
     Year 1 0.017 -0.001 1.388 0.006 -0.024 0.551 
Year 2 0.023 -0.011 2.003** 0.013 -0.023 1.890* 






Table 4.5  
Summary of Difference-in-difference of market share, ROA and Tobin’s Q 
The table shows the difference between three years average cumulative effects after the negative shocks and 
two year average cumulative effects before the shocks. The characteristics include market share, percentage of 
market share, relative ROA and relative Q for constrained and unconstrained, hedged and unhedged firm 
groups. The table includes only firms existing for all the time between year -2 and year 3 to mitigate the survival 
bias problem. Financial constrained group are defined using leverage ratio higher its industry median. The firm 
is considered to be ―hedged‖ if it has hedge ratio greater than industry average. Market share is calculated by the 
sales divided by the total sales of the three-digit-SIC industries. Relative ROA is calculated as EBIT divided by 
total asset adjusted by industry median. Relative Q is calculated as the ratio of market to book value adjusted by 
industry median. Industry is defined at the 3-digit-SIC level. *** indicates 1% significance level, ** indicates 5% 
significance level and * indicates 10% significance level. 
Panel A. Difference-in-difference  market share change 
  Constrained Unconstrained T-stat of difference 
Hedged 0.011 0.006 1.88* 
Unhedged -0.006 -0.001 -1.50 
T-stat of difference  2.84*** 2.03** 
 
    Panel B. Difference-in-difference  percentage market share change 
  Constrained Unconstrained T-stat of difference 
Hedged 0.037 0.074 -1.93* 
Unhedged -0.020 0.016 -2.15** 
T-stat of difference 2.43** 2.80*** 
 
    Panel C. Difference-in-difference  relative ROA  
  Constrained Unconstrained T-stat of difference 
Hedged 0.003 0.002 1.06 
Unhedged -0.022 -0.003 -1.54 
T-stat of difference 2.03** 1.16 
 
    Panel D. Difference-in-difference  relative Tobin‘s Q  
  Constrained Unconstrained T-stat of difference 
Hedged 0.006 0.145 -1.53 
Unhedged -0.141 0.060 -2.23** 





Table 4.6 Determinants of hedging 
The table shows how the determinants of hedging. Model (1) is Probit regression of hedge dummy, which 
equals to 1 if firms have any type of outstanding hedge. Model (2) is Probit regression of commodity hedge 
dummy. Column (3)-(5) report the Multinormial Logit regression, where depend variable take values of 
UU(Unconstrained and Unhedged), UH(Unconstrained and Hedged), CU(Constrained and Unhedged) and 
CH(Constrained and Hedged). Base outcome is UU. Hedged is 1 when firm‘s hedge ratio is higher than its 
industry average. Constrained is 1 when firms‘ leverage is higher than industry median. Hedge Ratio is calculated as 
dollar notional amount of commodity hedge divided by cost of goods sold. LTLCF is the log of 1+Tax Loss 
Carry Forward. Young_CEO is the dummy variable that equals to one if the age of CEO is under 45. Stock 
Compensation ratio is value of stock compensation divided by total compensation. Option Compensation ratio is the value 
of options compensation divided by total compensation. Other variables are defined in Table 2.  All independent 
variables are measured at t-1. All models include industry and year dummies. The marginal effects and the 
standard errors of interaction terms are adjusted using Ai and Norton (2003) methods. T-statistics are 
calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* indicates 1% 
/5%/10% significance level respectively.  




Tobit of hedge 
ratio 
Multinormial 
Logit of UH 
Multinormial 
Logit of CU  
Multinormial 
Logit of CH  
Log (size) 
 
0.047           
(2.14)** 
  
0.117           
(4.87)*** 
  
0.188           
(2.94)*** 
  
-0.459           
(-4.51)*** 
 
-0.216           
(-2.42)** 
Long term debt 
 
0.144           
(0.73)  
-0.17           





1.252           
(3.08)***  
1.101           
(2.50)**  
-1.022           
(-0.53)  
-3.574           
(-1.52) 
 




-0.57           
(-1.62)  
-1.298           
(-2.48)**  
7.011           
(3.65)***  
2.154           
(1.10) 
 




0.003           
(0.00)  
-17.368           
(-4.50)***  
-2.254           
(-0.86)  
-4.191           
(-0.22) 
 




1.298           
(3.31)***  
0.249           
(2.59)**  
-6.194           
(-4.01)***  
-8.020           
(-3.12)** 
 




-5.369           
(-2.27)**  
-7.587           
(-1.71)*  
-36.913           
(-4.77)***  
-12.28           
(-1.75)* 
 




-0.179           
(-2.60)**  
-0.099           
(-1.21)  
-0.288           
(-1.42)  
-0.310           
(-1.18) 
 




-0.307           
(-1.40)  
-0.521           
(-2.05)**  
6.254           
(8.76)***  
1.723           
(2.03)** 
 




0.018           
(2.17)**  
0.019           
(1.95)*  
0.067           
(1.59)  
0.118           
(2.53)** 
 




-0.141           
(-1.70)*  
-0.069           
(-1.85)*  
-0.096           
(-0.24)  
0.980           
(2.47)** 
 




0.111           
(1.66)*  
0.361           
(1.80)*  
0.477           
(2.47)***  
0.742           
(0.79) 
 
0.777           
(1.74)* 
Option 
compensation ratio  
-0.162           
(-1.91)*  
-0.123           
(-2.10)**  
-1.005           
(-2.01)**  
0.025           
(0.04) 
 
-0.988           
(-2.03)*** 
Constant 
     
0.401           
(0.90)  
2.469           
(5.14)*** 
 





























Table 4.7  
OLS regressions of market share growth difference and ROA difference 
The table shows OLS regressions of market share growth difference and ROA difference. The dependent 
variables in Model (1)-(3) are the difference between three years after shocks market share growth and two 
years before shock market share growth rate. The dependent variables in Model (4)-(6) are the difference 
between three years after shocks relative ROA and two years before shock relative ROA.  UU is dummy of 
Unconstrained and Unhedged; UH is dummy of Unconstrained and Hedged; CU is dummy of Constrained and 
Unhedged; CH is dummy of Constrained and Hedged. Hedged is 1 when firm‘s hedge ratio is higher than its 
industry average. Constrained is 1 when firms‘ leverage is higher than industry median. Other variables are 
defined in Table 2.  All independent variables are measured one year before the identified shocks. T-statistics 
are calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* 
indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. 
  
 
















-0.047              
(-0.58) 
  
 0.066           
(0.74) 
  
 0.035           
(0.42)  
0.025           
(0.68)  
0.024           
(0.65)  




-0.069              
(-0.85)  
-0.024           
(-0.24)  
 0.049           
(0.63)  
0.036           
(0.8)  
0.047           
(0.95)  




-0.166              
(-2.01)**  
-0.131           
(-2.27)**  
-0.162           
(-2.06)**  
-0.02           
(-1.86)*  
-0.019           
(-1.98)**  




0.036           
(2.76)***  
0.036           
(2.75)***  
0.034           
(2.50)**  
0.002           
(1.89)*  
0.002           
(1.89)*  
0.003           
(2.07)** 
Long term debt 
 
-0.058              
(-0.24)  
-0.054           
(-0.23)  
-0.034           
(-0.14)  
0.11           
(1.33)  
0.11           
(1.32)  




-1.672              
(-3.22)***  
-1.685           
(-3.24)***  
-1.634           
(-3.09)***  
-0.279           
(-1.97)*  
-0.274           
(-1.96)*  




-0.468              
(-1.57)  
-0.471           
(-1.58)  
-0.459           
(-1.53)  
    - 
 
    - 
 
    - 
Dividends 
 
1.016           
(1.51)  
0.989           
(1.49)  
1.13           
(1.74)*  
-0.137           
(-0.53)  
-0.13           
(-0.51)  




0.135           
(0.36)  
0.124           
(0.33)  
0.099           
(0.26)  
0.096           
(0.6)  
0.098           
(0.61)  




-0.694              
(-0.98)  
-0.702           
(-0.99)  
-0.633           
(-0.92)  
-0.58           
(-1.08)  
-0.579           
(-1.08)  




0.030           
(0.62)  
0.029           
(0.61)  
0.028           
(0.57)  
0.021           
(0.52)  
0.021           
(0.53)  




-0.414               
(-2.83)***  
-0.455           
(-2.91)***  
-0.500           
(-2.74)**  
0.01           
(1.74)*  
0.02           
(1.67)*  
0.022           
(1.91)* 
Herfindahl*CU 
   
-0.565           
(-2.07)**      
-0.134           
(-1.8)*   
Range of leverage 
     
-0.15           
(-1.81)*      
-0.005           
(2.09)** 
Range of leverage*CU 
     
-0.177           
(-2.56)**      




-0.022               
(-0.18)  
-0.016           
(-0.13)  
0.112           
(0.53)  
-0.048           
(-0.75)  
-0.05           
(-0.77)  































Table 4.8  
OLS regressions of market share growth and ROA with shock indicators 
The table shows pooled OLS regressions with shock indicators. The dependent variables in Model (1)-(5) are the cumulative 
market share growth at time t to t+2. The dependent variables in Model (6)-(7) are cumulative relative ROA at t+2.  Negative shocks 
are defined as top 75th percentile of commodity price growth rate excluding top quintile of industry sales growth and real GDP 
growth. See section II.C for details. UU is dummy of Unconstrained and Unhedged; UH is dummy of Unconstrained and Hedged; 
CU is dummy of Constrained and Unhedged; CH is dummy of Constrained and Hedged. Hedged is 1 when firm‘s hedge ratio is 
higher than its industry average. Other variables are defined in Table 2.  All independent variables are measured at t-1. Year 
dummies and industry dummies are included in all models. T-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard 
errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Market share 
growth at t 
Market share 
growth at t+1 
Market share 
growth at t+2 
Market share 
growth at t+2 
Market share 
growth at t+2 
Relative 
ROA at t+2 
Relative 
ROA at t+2 
UH 
 
-0.014           
(-1.04) 
  
0.002           
(0.49) 
  
0.070           
(2.17)** 
 
0.059           
(2.11)** 
 
0.062           
(-2.03)** 
 
0.028           
(1.84)* 
 




-0.028           
(-1.73)*  
-0.022           
(-0.72)  
-0.037           
(-0.79)  
-0.037           
(-0.78) 
 
-0.045           
(-0.96) 
 
-0.001       
(-0.04) 
 




-0.040           
(-2.37)**  
-0.066           
(-1.73)*  
-0.117           
(-2.06)**  
-0.230           
(-2.88)*** 
 
-0.230           
(-2.85)*** 
 
-0.043           
(-2.63)** 
 




0.032           
(2.10)**  
0.082           
(3.12)**  
0.103           
(2.42)**  
0.101           
(2.37)** 
 
0.097           
(2.29)** 
 
-0.009           
(-0.76) 
 




0.030           
(1.14)  
-0.019           
(-0.47)  
0.053           
(1.86)* 
 
0.053           
(1.86)* 
 
0.048           
(1.79)* 
 
0.026           
(1.41) 
 




0.017           
(0.57)  
-0.073           
(-1.62)  
-0.107           
(-1.65)  
-0.105           
(-1.63) 
 
-0.101           
(-1.58) 
 
0.041           
(1.98)** 
 




-0.023           
(-1.90)*  
-0.099           
(-2.14)**  
-0.126           
(-2.68)***  
-0.137           
(-1.45) 
 
-0.138           
(-1.44) 
 
-0.042           
(-1.85)* 
 




0.000           
(0.05)  
-0.01           
(-1.83)*  
-0.023           
(-2.43)**  
-0.023           
(-2.44)** 
 
-0.023           
(-2.46)** 
 
0.01           
(3.29)** 
 
0.01           
(3.30)*** 
Long term debt 
 
0.105           
(3.11)***  
0.12           
(1.70)*  
0.139           
(1.14)  
0.144           
(1.18) 
 
0.149           
(1.22) 
 
0.039           
(0.89) 
 




0.114           
(1.25)  
0.248           
(1.23)  
0.232           
(0.78)  
0.245           
(0.82) 
 
0.224           
(0.75) 
 
-0.189           
(-2.00)** 
 




0.043           
(0.71)  
0.123           
(0.93)  
0.019           
(0.09)  
0.023           
(0.10) 
 
0.021           
(0.09) 
 
1.573           
(13.03)**
*  




-0.501           
(-3.68)***  
-0.623           
(-2.29)**  
-0.591           
(-0.96)  
-0.612           
(-1.02) 
 
-0.628           
(-1.05) 
 
-0.216           
(-0.90) 
 




0.184           
(2.09)**  
0.357           
(2.65)**  
0.405           
(2.04)**  
0.406           
(2.03)** 
 
0.417           
(2.09)** 
 
-0.110           
(-1.21) 
 




0.657           
(2.54)**  
1.591           
(3.20)***  
1.119           
(1.39)  
1.097           
(1.37) 
 
1.136           
(1.41) 
 
-0.034           
(-0.13) 
 




0.023           
(2.72)***  
0.029           
(2.06)**  
0.048           
(2.06)**  
0.047           
(1.99)** 
 
0.048           
(2.02)** 
 
-0.001           
(-0.12) 
 




-0.047           
(-2.07)**  
-0.075           
(-2.14)**  
-0.124           
(-2.29)**  
-0.147           
(-2.00)** 
 
-0.207           
(-2.30)** 
 
-0.042           
(-1.88)* 
 
-0.045           
(-1.94)* 
Herfindahl*CU* 
Negative shock    
-0.162           
(-
2.77)*** 
   







-0.457           
(-2.33)** 
Herfindahl*CU 
   
0.106           
(1.16)    







0.006           
(0.04) 
Range of 
leverage         
 









        
 









Table 4.8  
OLS regressions of market share growth and ROA with shock indicators,  Continued 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Market share 
growth at t 
Market share 
growth at t+1 
Market share 
growth at t+2 
Market share 
growth at t+2 
Market share 
growth at t+2 
Relative 
ROA at t+2 
Relative 
ROA at t+2 
 








leverage* CU         
 




















1.22           
(14.54)**
*  
1.307           
(11.46)**
*  
-0.117          
(-4.57)*** 
 





































Table 4.9   Two stage regressions of market share growth and ROA  
The table shows two stage regressions with instruments of Female_CEO dummy, Yound_CEO dummy, stock compensation ratio and 
options compensation ratio. The definitions are in Table 5. The dependent variables in Model (1)-(2) are the difference between three 
years after shocks market share growth and two years before shock market share growth rate. The dependent variables in Model (3) 
are the difference between three years after shocks relative ROA and two years before shock relative ROA. The dependent 
variables in Model (4)-(6) are the cumulative market share growth at time t and t+2. The dependent variable in Model (7) is 
cumulative relative ROA at t+2. Negative shocks are defined as top 75th percentile of commodity price growth rate excluding top 
quintile of industry sales growth and real GDP growth. See section II.C for details. UU is dummy of Unconstrained and Unhedged; 
UH is dummy of Unconstrained and Hedged; CU is dummy of Constrained and Unhedged; CH is dummy of Constrained and 
Hedged. Hedged is 1 when firm‘s hedge ratio is higher than its industry average. Other variables are defined in Table 2.  All 
independent variables are measured at t-1. Year dummies are included in all models. Industry dummies are included in model (4)-
(7). T-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* indicates 1% 
/5%/10% significance level respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 



















ROA at t+2 
UH 
 
0.151           
(2.21)** 
  
0.152           
(2.22)* 
  
0.001           
(1.04) 
 
-0.013           
(-0.67) 
 
0.041           
(1.76)* 
 
0.042           
(1.80)* 
 




0.012           
(0.11)  
0.020           
(0.17)  
0.005           
(1.16)  
-0.026           
(-1.09) 
 
-0.037           
(-0.50) 
 
-0.036           
(-0.49) 
 




-0.099           
(-1.92)*  
-0.097           
(-2.09)**  
-0.016           
(-2.55)**  
-0.023           
(-1.34) 
 
-0.141           
(-2.56)** 
 
-0.133           
(-2.37)** 
 
-0.025           
(-1.81)* 
Negative shock 
       
0.023           
(1.30) 
 
-0.005           
(-0.14) 
 
-0.010           
(-0.28) 
 
-0.010           
(-0.82) 
Negative shock 
* UH       
 
0.049           
(1.66)* 
 
0.309           
(2.84)** 
 
0.312           
(2.87)** 
 
0.041           
(1.03) 
Negative shock 
* CH        
0.092           
(2.01)** 
 
0.077        
(1.34) 
 
0.081        
(1.45) 
 
0.006           
(0.34) 
Negative shock 
* CU        
-0.037           
(-1.18) 
 
-0.143           
(-2.50)** 
 
-0.024           
(-2.18)** 
 




0.014           
(0.52)  
0.015           
(0.56)  
0.004           
(0.67)  
-0.002           
(-0.41) 
 
-0.015           
(-1.18) 
 
-0.015           
(-1.15) 
 
-0.006           
(-1.34) 
Long term debt 
 
-0.008           
(-0.03)  
-0.018           
(-0.06)  
0.116           
(1.51)  
0.088           
(1.86)* 
 
0.074           
(0.48) 
 
0.066           
(0.42) 
 




-1.178           
(-2.05)**  
-1.17           
(-2.03)**  
-0.446           
(-1.95)*  
0.007           
(0.06) 
 
0.411           
(1.18) 
 
0.398           
(1.15) 
 




-1.397           
(-3.18)***  
-1.425           
(-3.17)***  
    - 
 
-0.120           
(-1.07) 
 
-0.277           
(-0.84) 
 
-0.306           
(-0.91) 
 




1.53           
(4.48)***  
1.529           
(4.46)***  
-0.033           
(-0.34)  
-0.483           
(-1.47) 
 
-1.505           
(-2.26)** 
 
-1.468           
(-2.22)** 
 




0.507           
(0.65)  
0.522           
(0.67)  
0.409           
(1.76)*  
0.139           
(1.29) 
 
0.814           
(3.28)*** 
 
0.812           
(3.30)*** 
 




-2.48           
(-1.34)  
-2.817           
(-1.35)  
-0.146           
(-0.24)  
0.112           
(0.35) 
 
1.378           
(1.67)* 
 
0.927           
(1.15) 
 




0.132           
(2.12)**  
0.133           
(2.13)**  
-0.009           
(-0.38)  
0.045           
(3.41)*** 
 
0.073           
(2.44)** 
 
0.076           
(2.54)** 
 




-0.207           
(-2.03)**  
-0.219           
(-2.08)**  
-0.028           
(-1.68)*  
-0.074           
(-2.18)** 
 
-0.283           
(-3.11)*** 
 
-0.304           
(-3.38)*** 
 









-0.918           
(-2.85)*** 
 
-0.244           
(-2.12)** 
Herfindahl*CU 
   
-0.386           




0.626           
(1.82)* 
 





Table 4.9  Two stage regressions of market share growth and ROA,  continued 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 























0.051           
(0.17)  
0.05           
(0.17)  
-0.013           
(-0.2)  
0.996           
(22.82)**
*  
1.137           
(8.81)*** 
 
1.142           
(8.93)*** 
 





































Table 5.1   Regressions of competition measures  
The table shows pooled OLS regressions of competition measures. Model (1) and (2) are regressions of advertising expense growth 
rate at t and at t and t+1 respectively, where t is the years of negative shocks only. Model (3) and (4) are regressions of adjusted 
Price-Cost-Margin at t, where t is the years of negative shocks only. Model (5) and (6) are regressions of advertising expense 
growth rate at t and at t with the whole sample. Model (7) is regression of adjusted Price-Cost-Margin at t with the whole sample.  
Negative shocks are defined as top 75th percentile of commodity price growth rate excluding top quintile of industry sales growth and 
real GDP growth. See section II.C for details. UU is dummy of Unconstrained and Unhedged; UH is dummy of Unconstrained 
and Hedged; CU is dummy of Constrained and Unhedged; CH is dummy of Constrained and Hedged. Hedged is 1 when firm‘s 
hedge ratio is higher than its industry average. Other variables are defined in Table 2.  All independent variables are measured at t-1. 
Year dummies are included in all models. Industry dummies are included in model (5)-(7). T-statistics are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level 
respectively. 
 




growth at t 
Advertising 
expense 




Margin at t 
Adjusted 
Price-Cost-
Margin at t 
Advertising 
expense 
growth at t 
Advertising 
expense 
growth at t 
Adjusted 
Price-Cost-
Margin at t 
UH 
 
0.010           
(2.16)** 
  
0.015           
(1.98)** 
  
-0.005           
(-2.80)*** 
 
-0.001           
(-1.93)* 
 
0.016           
(2.25)** 
 
0.017           
(1.75)* 
 




0.004           
(1.25)  
0.012           
(1.71)*  
-0.002           
(-1.22)  
-0.002           
(-1.21)  
0.025           
(2.89)*** 
 
0.025           
(2.90)** 
 




-0.003           
(-1.20)  
-0.005           
(-1.25)  
-0.001           
(-0.50)  
-0.006           
(-0.80)  
-0.004           
(-0.49) 
 
-0.004           
(-0.50) 
 
0.081           
(1.15) 
Negative shock 
         
0.015           
(1.55) 
 
0.015           
(1.55) 
 
0.075           
(1.29) 
Negative 




0.021           
(1.99)** 
 
0.030           
(2.02)** 
 
-0.073           
(-2.42)** 
Negative 
shock*CH          
-0.037           
(-2.84)*** 
 
-0.037           
(-2.83)** 
 
-0.055           
(-1.02) 
Negative 
shock*CU          
0.000           
(0.02) 
 
0.000           
(0.02) 
 




-0.005           
(-1.83)*  
-0.002           
(-0.81)  
0.000           
(-0.25)  
0.000           
(-0.18)  
-0.001           
(-1.35) 
 
-0.001           
(-1.37) 
 
-0.003           
(-0.87) 
Long term debt 
 
-0.07           
(-2.35)**  
-0.066           
(-2.09)**  
0.010           
(0.65)  
0.011           
(0.72)  
-0.034           
(-2.05)** 
 
-0.034           
(-2.08)** 
 




-0.213           
(-1.81)*  
-0.087           
(-0.82)  
-0.220      
(-4.31)***  
-0.219           
(-4.26)***  
-0.115           
(-2.27)** 
 
-0.115           
(-2.29)** 
 




0.042           
(0.89)  
0.01           
(0.19)  
0.059           
(1.21)  
0.06           
(1.23)  
0.076           
(2.95)*** 
 
0.076           
(2.96)*** 
 




-0.033           
(-0.42)  
0.202           
(1.03)  
-0.020           
(-0.56)  
-0.026           
(-0.72)  
-0.013           
(-0.09) 
 
-0.012           
(-0.09) 
 




-0.133           
(-1.73)*  
-0.069           
(-1.02)  
-0.048           
(-1.34)  
-0.048           
(-1.32)  
-0.050           
(-1.59) 
 
-0.05           
(-1.59) 
 




-0.106           
(-0.65)  
-0.238           
(-1.27)  
0.218           
(2.75)**  
0.219           
(2.73)**  
0.033           
(0.54) 
 
0.035           
(0.57) 
 




0.007           
(1.19)  
-0.001           
(-0.11)  
0.002           
(0.29)  
0.002           
(0.31)  
0.001           
(0.28) 
 
0.001           
(0.27) 
 




-0.004           
(-0.11)  
0.009           
(0.24)  
0.025           
(2.06)**  
0.041           
(2.07)**  
-0.015           
(-1.32) 
 
-0.018           
(-1.05) 
 
0.014           
(0.44) 
Herfindahl*UH 
       
-0.033           
(-2.36)**   
 
-0.001           
(-0.03) 
 





Table 5.1   Regressions of competition measures,  continued 
 




growth at t 
Advertising 
expense 




Margin at t 
Adjusted 
Price-Cost-
Margin at t 
Advertising 
expense 
growth at t 
Advertising 
expense 
growth at t 
Adjusted 
Price-Cost-
Margin at t 
 
Herfindahl*UH* 
Negative shock           
 
0.026           
(2.72)*** 
 




0.044           
(2.21)**  
0.025           
(1.07)  
-0.007           
(-0.77)  
-0.01           
(-0.99)  
1.22           
(0.61) 
 
0.007           
(0.78) 
 





































Table 5.2  
Regressions of market share growth with product differentiation measures  
The table shows pooled OLS regressions of market share growth with interactions of product differentiation measures. 
Model (1)-(3) are regressions of market share growth rate difference. Model (4)-(6) are regressions of market share growth 
rate at t and t+1 with the whole sample. Product differentiation measures include: RD, which is R&D expense divided by 
sales; PCM difference, which is absolute value of the difference between firms‘ previous two years Price-Cost-Margin (PCM) 
and the industry median; PCM dispersion, which is the standard deviation of previous two years PCM within industry. (See 
section IV.B for details.) Negative shocks are defined as top 75th percentile of commodity price growth rate excluding top 
quintile of industry sales growth and real GDP growth. (See section II.C for details.) UU is dummy of Unconstrained and 
Unhedged; UH is dummy of Unconstrained and Hedged; CU is dummy of Constrained and Unhedged; CH is dummy of 
Constrained and Hedged. Hedged is 1 when firm‘s hedge ratio is higher than its industry average. Control variables not 
reported are log size, Long term debt, Investment, ROA, Dividends ratio, cash holdings ratio, R&D expense, Q and 
Herfindahl. Other variables are defined in Table 2. All independent variables are measured at t-1. Year dummies are 
included in all models. Industry dummies are included in model (4)-(6). T-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity 
adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 





















0.059           
(1.67)* 
  
0.064           
(1.72)* 
  
0.054           
(1.60) 
 
0.048           
(1.04) 
 
0.058           
(1.23) 
 




0.001           
(0.01)  
0.032           
(0.36)  
0.095           
(0.99)  
0.028           
(0.49)  
0.032           
(0.56) 
 




-0.139           
(-2.14)**  
-0.129           
(-2.25)**  
-0.144           
(-2.38)**  
-0.05           
(-1.69)*  
-0.06           
(-1.96)* 
 
-0.015           
(-1.20) 
Negative shock 
       
0.048           
(1.10)  
0.063           
(1.37) 
 
0.056           
(1.22) 
Negative shock*UH 
      
 
0.020           
(1.73)* 
 
0.017           
(1.87)* 
 
0.016           
(1.87)* 
Negative shock*CH 
       
-0.046           
(-0.74)  
-0.059           
(-0.91) 
 
-0.047           
(-0.73) 
Negative shock*CU 
       
-0.134           
(-1.93)*  
-0.121           
(-2.13)** 
 




-0.829           
(-1.02)  
-0.716           
(-1.05)  
-0.761           
(-1.03)  
2.625           
(2.97)**  
2.843           
(4.05)** 
 




1.747           
(0.69) 
     
0.964           
(0.78) 
    RD*CU* Negative 
shocks 
       
-0.376           
(-0.17) 
    PCM difference 
   
-0.169           
(-0.49) 
     
0.125           
(0.57) 
  PCM difference* 
CU 
   
-0.424           
(-0.6) 
     
0.382           
(0.93) 
  PCM difference* 
CU* Negative 
shocks 
         
0.084           
(0.14) 
  PCM dispersion 
     
0.109           
(0.97) 
     




     
0.328           
(2.36)** 
     





Table 5.2    
Regressions of market share growth with product differentiation measures, 
continued  
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 























           




-0.025           
(-0.2)  
-0.03           
(-0.24)  
-0.041           
(-0.31)  




1.097           
(15.40)*** 
 































Table 6.1    
Summary Statistics of firms exiting and the remaining in the sample 
The table shows the summary statistics of the characteristics of the firms who exit the sample during 1994-
2008 and the remaining firms. Firm is considered to be an ―exit‖ firm if the latest sample year is not 2008. The 
firm is considered to be ―hedge‖ if it uses financial derivative or long-term contract to hedge exposure in 
commodity during the fiscal year. The variables are defined the same as in table 2. Market share is calculated by 
the sales divided by the total sales of the three-digit-SIC industries.  ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% 
significance level respectively. 
  Exit firms  Remaining Firms T-stat of 
the 
difference   Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
N  329   5947   
Hedge Measures       
Any hedge 0.381 0.49  0.493 0.50 -4.06*** 
Dummy of exchange or commodity hedge 0.274 0.45  0.369 0.48 -3.74*** 
Dummy of commodity hedge 0.190 0.40  0.233 0.42 -1.90* 
Hedge ratio 0.113 0.10  0.186 0.23 -3.64*** 
General firm characteristics       
Size (in millions) 1758.8 7264.8  4209.4 20762.7 -5.08*** 
Age (years) 19.31 14.98  20.38 17.05 -1.25 
R&D expense  0.028 0.09  0.025 0.06   0.62 
investment 0.049 0.05  0.062 0.06 -4.62*** 
Financial condition measures       
Leverage  0.337 0.24  0.287 0.20  3.80*** 
cash holdings  0.056 0.08  0.064 0.09 -1.77* 
Current Ratio  1.829 1.35  2.177 1.77 -4.47*** 
KZ Index without Q measure 0.657 1.40  0.313 1.34  4.36*** 
Performance measures       
operation profit margin 0.051 0.15  0.097 0.11 -5.45*** 
ROA relative to industry -0.052 0.15  -0.012 0.13 -4.79*** 
Q 1.448 1.05  1.494 0.96 -0.78 
Relative to Industry sales growth -0.018 0.28  0.053 0.31 -4.50*** 
Market share 0.076 0.16  0.093 0.18 -1.90* 
Industry competition measures       
Herfindahl 0.256 0.18  0.257 0.19 -0.12 






Table 6.2   Probit and Cox-Hazard regressions of firms exiting the sample  
The table shows regression of firms who exit the sample. Model (1)-(3) are Probit regressions of firm exit the sample. 
Model (4)-(5) are Cox-hazard regressions of exit. Model (6)-(7) are Multinomial Logit regressions of a dependent variable 
with outcomes of merge exit, other exit and not exit, where not exit is the base outcome. A firm is considered to Exit if the 
last year of data is not 2008. The last data year+1 is considered to be the exit year. A firm is considered to be a Merger Exit if 
the first digit of delisting code from CRSP is 2. UU is dummy of Unconstrained and Unhedged; UH is dummy of 
Unconstrained and Hedged; CU is dummy of Constrained and Unhedged; CH is dummy of Constrained and Hedged. 
Hedged is 1 when firm‘s hedge ratio is higher than its industry average. Other variables are defined in Table 2. All 
independent variables are measured at t-1. Year dummies and Industry dummies are included in all models. Marginal effects 
are reported instead of raw coefficients in model (1)-(3). The marginal effects and the standard errors of interaction terms 
are adjusted using Ai and Norton (2003) methods. T-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity adjusted standard 
errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. 




















-0.020           
(-1.19) 
  
-0.017           
(-1.03) 
  
-0.016           
(-0.96) 
 
0.835           
(-0.74) 
 
0.803           
(-0.66) 
 
0.027           
(0.12) 
 




0.024           
(1.28)  
0.022           
(1.17)  
0.021           
(1.15)  
1.113           
(0.32)  
1.103           
(0.29) 
 
0.081           
(0.30) 
 




0.041           
(3.44)***  
0.025           
(1.75)*  
-0.013           
(-0.38)  
1.543           
(2.44)**  
0.71           
(-0.47) 
 
0.255           
(0.87) 
 




-0.013           
(-6.35)***  
-0.013           
(-6.40)***  
-0.013           
(-6.45)***  
0.792           
(-8.70)***  
0.788           
(-8.79)*** 
 
0.311           
(7.72)*** 
 
-0.218           
(-6.76)*** 
Long term debt 
 
-0.04           
(-1.32)  
-0.040           
(-1.34)  
-0.041           
(-1.37)  
0.531           
(-1.34)  
0.554           
(-1.20) 
 
-0.319           
(-0.52) 
 




-0.097           
(-1.26)  
-0.100           
(-1.29)  
-0.105           
(-1.35)  
4.404           
(1.13)  
4.512           
(1.14) 
 
-0.372           
(-0.22) 
 




-0.067           
(-2.09)**  
-0.067           
(-2.09)**  
-0.065           
(-2.04)**  
0.487           
(-1.57)  
0.474           
(-1.62) 
 
2.411           
(1.50) 
 




0.160           
(2.02)**  
0.161           
(2.06)**  
0.153           
(1.92)*  
8.826           
(1.74)*  
8.441           
(1.51) 
 
4.185           
(2.77)*** 
 




-0.075           
(-1.70)*  
-0.076           
(-1.73)*  
-0.071           
(-1.62)  
0.125           
(-2.12)**  
0.135           
(-2.05)** 
 
4.621           
(5.04)*** 
 




-0.172           
(-1.21)  
-0.178           
(-1.24)  
-0.155           
(-1.13)  
0.032           
(-1.05)  
0.063           
(-0.91) 
 
4.168           
(0.57) 
 




-0.004           
(-0.73)  
-0.004           
(-0.74)  
-0.003           
(-0.66)  
0.969           
(-0.36)  
0.972           
(-0.32) 
 
-2.827           
(-5.77)*** 
 




-0.031           
(-1.39)  
-0.054           
(-1.72)*  
-0.083           
(-2.17)**  
0.357           
(-2.41)**  
0.149           
(-2.35)** 
 
1.455           
(3.74)*** 
 
-0.040           
(-0.08) 
Herfindahl*CU 
   
0.049           
(2.04)**  
0.081           
(2.46)**    
1.959           
(2.61)** 
 
0.303           
(0.45) 
 
0.092           
(2.13)** 
Range of 
leverage      
-0.041           
(-1.67)    







leverage*CU      
0.046           
(2.17)**    







          
 
-2.293           
(-6.31)*** 
 












































Figure 1 Time Series of Selected Commodity prices 
 
Figure 1a US Kerosene-Type Jet Fuel Spot Price (cents per gallon) 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
 
Figure 1b Aluminum Spot Price (Cents Per Pound) 
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Figure 1c Natural Gas Spot Price (Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet) 
 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
Figure 1d Cotton Spot Price (Cents per pound) 
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Figure 2   
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Figure 3  
Cumulative effect of negative shocks on market shares and relative ROA 
Figure 3a Cumulated Market Share Changes 
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Figure 4  
Cumulative effect of positive shocks on market shares and relative ROA 
Figure 4a Cumulated Market Share Changes 
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Appendix A   Hedging data details  
    Firms‘ hedging data are obtained by keywords searching in SEC 10-K filings. After June 
15, 1997, firms are required to report Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market 
Risk (Item 7A in 10-K). The rules address risks arising from changes in interest rates, foreign 
currency exchange rates, commodity prices, equity prices, and other market changes that 
affect market risk sensitive instruments. Therefore after 1998, for each 10-K, I first read 
Item 7A (Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk) and record the 
following data if available: 1) whether a firm hedges interest rate, foreign exchange rate 
and/or commodity prices risk. 2) What instruments does the firm use to hedge? 3) What are 
the notional values of the derivative hedge? 4) What are the fair values of outstanding 
derivative instruments? 5) What are the gains and losses of the derivative hedges? If hedges 
are mentioned but no detailed information is disclosed in Item 7A or for years before 1998 
when disclosure of market risk is not required, keywords search will be done for the whole 
text of 10-K. The keywords are searched in the following order: ―hedg‖, ―derivative‖, and 
―raw material‖. The keywords search process is ended when all the above information is 
found or no information is found after all keywords are searched, in which case, the firm is 
considered to be unhedged.  
The hedge ratio is defined as total notional value of hedges divided by this year‘s Cost of 
Goods Sold (COGS), except for the Airlines industry, where all firms report notional 




industry, when quarterly hedges are reported, the annual hedge ratio is defined as the average 
of quarterly hedge ratios. For example, if the company reports ―we hedge 44%, 23%, 4% 
and 1% of its anticipated aircraft fuel consumption for the first, second, third and fourth 
quarters of 2007‖, the total notional value for its 2007 hedge is 18% (= 
             
 
). 
The same average method is used when the reported notional (fair) value is the dollar value 
of the contracts in other industries. When firms report notional (fair) value separately for 
different commodities, for example copper, aluminum and zinc for metal industries, the total 
value is recorded. When firms report notional (fair) value separately for different contracts, 
for example forward, collar and options, the total value is recorded. The firm is defined as 
option hedge user if it uses options, collar or cap contracts.  The realized gain or loss is 







Appendix B   Summary statistics of different samples 
The table shows the mean, median and standard deviations of firm and industry characteristics of all firms in Compustat, all manufacturing firms and the final 
sample used in the paper. Size is the market value at the end of each year. Age is the years since it first appears in CRSP. R&D expense is scaled by sales and 
shown in percentage. Investment is the capital expenditure divided by total assets. Leverage is the book value of the total debt divided by the total asset. Cash 
holdings are the cash and cash equivalent investment divided by the total asset. KZ index is defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo, (2001) formula. 
Operating profit margin is the gross income divided by total sales. ROA is the operating income divided by the total asset. Q is the market value of equity plus 
book value of debt divided by the total assets. Herfindahl is the sum of squared market share of the top 50 firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. Number of firms is the 
number of firms in 3-digit-SIC industry. The sample period is 1994-2008.  
  
All Firms in Compustat  All Manufacturing Firms  Firms in Final Sample 
Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev. 
N  145265    53218    6276   
General firm characteristics            
Size (in millions) 2206.59 129.04 12694.2  2470.59 123.62 12852.6  3799.25 206.40 19126.6 
Age (years) 12.40 8.00 12.8  14.31 9.00 14.0  20.26 15.00 16.6 
R&D expense  0.093 0.030 0.94  0.110 0.053 0.16  0.026 0.011 0.07 
Investment 0.062 0.038 0.08  0.053 0.038 0.05  0.062 0.046 0.06 
Financial condition measures            
Leverage  0.246 0.203 0.23  0.230 0.194 0.21  0.292 0.271 0.20 
Cash holdings  0.105 0.044 0.15  0.123 0.061 0.16  0.062 0.030 0.08 
KZ Index 0.745 0.728 1.03  0.706 0.701 0.99  0.710 0.743 0.95 
KZ Index without Q measure 0.286 0.230 1.02  0.238 0.196 1.00  0.412 0.438 0.98 
Performance measures            
Operation profit margin 0.135 0.124 0.25  0.068 0.101 0.20  0.094 0.100 0.11 
ROA 0.022 0.055 0.18  0.016 0.066 0.21  0.069 0.081 0.12 
Q 1.835 1.345 1.38  1.957 1.450 1.46  1.440 1.208 0.88 
Sales growth 1.148 1.088 0.35  1.128 1.078 0.34  1.098 1.068 0.26 
Industry competition measures            
Herfindahl  0.142 0.100 0.14  0.157 0.108 0.15  0.261 0.233 0.19 
Number of firms 186.3 72.0 235.3  116.3 55.0 116.7  26.0 23.0 20.0 
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Appendix C   Related accounting standard  
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133, Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities, commonly known as FAS 133, is an accounting 
standard issued in June 1998 by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) that 
requires companies to measure all assets and liabilities on their balance sheet at ―fair value‖.   
FAS133 requires adopted entities comply with the statement by 12/31/2001.  
To be designated and qualify for FAS 133 hedge accounting, a commodity (hedged item) and 
its hedging instrument must have a correlation ratio between 80% and 125%, and the 
reporting enterprise must have hedge documentation in place at the inception of the hedge.  
This Statement establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments, 
including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, (collectively referred 
to as derivatives) and for hedging activities. It requires that an entity recognize all derivatives 
as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those 
instruments at fair value. If certain conditions are met, a derivative may be specifically 
designated as (a) a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or 
liability or an unrecognized firm commitment, (b) a hedge of the exposure to variable cash 
flows of a forecasted transaction, or (c) a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a net 
investment in a foreign operation, an unrecognized firm commitment, an available-for-sale 
security, or a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction.  
The accounting for changes in the fair value of a derivative (that is, gains and losses) 
depends on the intended use of the derivative and the resulting designation.  
For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a 
recognized asset or liability or a firm commitment (referred to as a fair value hedge), the gain 
or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change together with the offsetting loss or 




is to reflect in earnings the extent to which the hedge is not effective in achieving offsetting 
changes in fair value.  
For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted 
transaction (referred to as a cash flow hedge), the effective portion of the derivatives gain or 
loss is initially reported as a component of other comprehensive income (outside earnings) 
and subsequently reclassified into earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. 
The ineffective portion of the gain or loss is reported in earnings immediately.  
For a derivative designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a 
foreign operation, the gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income (outside 
earnings) as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. The accounting for a fair value 
hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency 
exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment or an available-for-sale security. Similarly, 
the accounting for a cash flow hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a 
hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted 
transaction.  
For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in 





Appendix D1  Robustness with other measures of financial constraints 
The table shows the robustness tests. Panel A shows the regressions of diff-in-diff market share growth using 
different measures of financial constraints. KZ index is defined using Lamont, Polk, and Saá-Requejo, (2001) 
formula without Q measure. GSA index is calculated as Hadlock and Pierce (2009). Debt rating measures a firm 
to be constrained if he has S&P debt rating below CCC or if he doesn‘t have a debt rating with non-zero debt 
outstanding. Pledgeable measures a firm is to be constrained if he has pledgeable assets below its industry median, 
where pledgeable is defined as tangible asset minus book value of debt divided by total assets. WW index is 
financial constraint index is defined using Whited and Wu (2006). See section II for detailed data definition. T-
statistics are calculated using standard errors clustering in firms and adjusted for heterogeneity. ***/**/* 
indicates 1% /5%/10% significance level respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






0.055           
(1.68)*  
-0.014           
(-1.18)  
 0.060           
(1.88)*  
0.080           
(2.07)**  




0.042           
(1.45)  
0.035           
(0.29)  
0.036           
(1.58)  
-0.103           
(-0.99)  




-0.013           
(-1.92)*  
-0.014           
(-2.15)**  
-0.061           
(-2.56)**  
-0.086           
(-2.88)***  




0.038           
(2.79)***  
0.039           
(3.04)***  
0.046           
(2.74)***  
0.037           
(2.78)***  
0.048           
(3.05)*** 
Long term debt 
 
-0.113           
(-0.51)  
-0.108           
(-0.51)  
-0.068           
(-0.34)  
-0.313           
(-1.19)  




-1.673           
(-3.23)***  
-1.715           
(-3.29)***  
-1.716           
(-3.41)***  
-1.62           
(-3.06)***  




-0.483           
(-1.61)  
-0.489           
(-1.65)  
-0.504           
(-1.69)*  
-0.445           
(-1.47)  




0.984           
(1.47)  
0.975           
(1.31)  
0.934           
(1.40)  
1.037           
(1.57)  




0.141           
(0.38)  
0.074           
(0.20)  
0.088           
(0.22)  
0.187           
(0.51)  




-0.681           
(-0.96)  
-0.706           
(-0.98)  
-0.691           
(-0.94)  
-0.75           
(-1.01)  




0.024           
(0.50)  
0.023           
(0.48)  
0.023           
(0.46)  
0.025           
(0.50)  




-0.413           
(-2.64)**  
-0.411           
(-2.67)***  
-0.435           
(-2.85)***  
-0.406           
(-2.64)**  




-0.239           
(-1.79)*  
-0.354           
(-2.69)***  
-0.988           
(-3.25)***  
-0.14           
(-0.37)  




-0.022           
(-0.17)  
-0.004           
(-0.03)  
-0.046           
(-0.29)  
0.098           
(0.72)  



























Appendix D2   
Cumulative effects for 2 years after the shocks, including 2007 shocks 
The table shows the cumulative effects and diff-in-diff of negative shocks on market share, percentage of 
market share and profitability measured by relative ROA for constrained and unconstrained, hedged and 
unhedged firm groups. The diff-in-diff measures are calculated as cumulative effect over year 1 to 2  minus 2 
years cumulative effect before the shock. The table includes only firms existing for all the time between year 0 
and year 2 to mitigate the survival bias problem. Financial constrained group are defined using leverage ratio 
higher its industry median. The firm is considered to be ―hedged‖ if it has hedge ratio greater than industry 
average. Market share is calculated by the sales divided by the total sales of the three-digit-SIC industries. ROA is 
calculated as EBIT divided by total asset adjusted by industry median ROA at the 3-digit-SIC level.  *** 
indicates 1% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level and * indicates 10% significance level. 
 
  
Constrained firms T-stat of 
difference   
Unconstrained firms T-stat of 
difference Hedged Unhedged Hedged Unhedged 
Cumulative market share change 
     Year 1 0.005 -0.001 1.94* 
 
0.004 0.002 1.06 
Year 2 0.005 -0.002 2.11** 
 
0.005 0.001 1.87* 
Diff-in-diff -0.001 -0.002 1.26 
 
0.006 0.002 1.85* 
        Cumulative percentage market share change 
    Year 1 0.009 -0.010 2.24** 
 
0.065 0.026 1.69* 
Year 2 0.029 -0.001 2.08** 
 
0.136 0.017 3.23* 
Diff-in-diff 0.035 0.013 1.84* 
 
0.108 0.040 1.73* 
        Cumulative relative ROA change 
     Year 1 -0.007 -0.026 2.34** 
 
0.002 0.003 1.39 
Year 2 0.000 -0.032 2.39** 
 
0.011 -0.004 1.78* 
Diff-in-diff 0.000 -0.014 1.95* 
 





Appendix D3 Cumulative effects for 5 years after the shocks 
The table shows the cumulative effects and difference-in-difference of negative shocks on market share, 
percentage of market share and profitability measured by relative ROA for constrained and unconstrained, 
hedged and unhedged firm groups. The diff-in-diff measures are calculated as cumulative effect over year 1 to 5 
minus 2 years cumulative effect before the shock. The table includes only firms existing for all the time 
between year 0 and year 5 to mitigate the survival bias problem. Financial constrained group are defined using 
leverage ratio higher its industry median. The firm is considered to be ―hedged‖ if it has hedge ratio greater 
than industry average. Market share is calculated by the sales divided by the total sales of the three-digit-SIC 
industries. ROA is calculated as EBIT divided by total asset adjusted by industry median ROA at the 3-digit-




T-stat of the 
difference   
Unconstrained firms T-stat of 
the 
difference Hedged Unhedged Hedged Unhedged 
Cumulative market share change 
     Year 1 0.011 -0.002 1.23 
 
0.002 0.002 0.15 
Year 2 0.005 -0.004 1.83* 
 
0.008 0.002 1.19 
Year 3 0.003 -0.005 1.67* 
 
0.009 0.001 1.78* 
Year 4 0.001 -0.008 1.76* 
 
0.009 0.000 1.89* 
Year 5 0.002 -0.006 1.81* 
 
0.006 -0.002 2.23** 
Diff-in-diff 0.001 -0.004 1.91* 
 
0.005 -0.001 2.03** 
        Cumulative percentage market share change 
    Year 1 -0.014 -0.047 1.43 
 
0.072 0.027 1.39 
Year 2 -0.010 -0.062 1.41 
 
0.139 0.047 1.54 
Year 3 -0.018 -0.033 1.34 
 
0.182 0.037 2.35** 
Year 4 -0.014 -0.047 1.94 
 
0.259 0.015 3.25*** 
Year 5 -0.005 -0.061 2.25** 
 
0.296 -0.023 3.86*** 
Diff-in-diff 0.002 -0.021 2.98*** 
 
0.254 -0.011 3.14*** 
        Cumulative relative ROA change 
     Year 1 -0.002 -0.044 1.70* 
 
0.007 0.013 -0.377 
Year 2 -0.005 -0.069 1.96* 
 
0.021 0.016 0.843 
Year 3 -0.004 -0.080 2.38** 
 
0.028 0.005 1.957* 
Year 4 -0.011 -0.119 2.50** 
 
0.039 0.015 2.002** 
Year 5 -0.018 -0.157 2.68*** 
 
0.041 0.034 1.812* 
Diff-in-diff -0.019 -0.141 2.71*** 
 





Appendix E   Main results for different industries  
The table shows the pooled OLS regressions with shock indicators. The dependent variables are the cumulative market share 
growth from time t to t+2. Columns (1) and (2) show results for the Airlines industry; columns (3) and (4) show 
results for the Metal industries (SIC 3300-3499); columns (5) and (6) show results for the Petroleum industry; 
columns (7) and (8) show results for the other industries.  See section II for detailed data definition. T-statistics 
are calculated using standard errors clustering in firms and adjusted for heterogeneity.  
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Airlines Airlines Metals Metals Petroleum Petroleum Others Others 
UH 
 
0.072           
(0.67) 
  
0.068           
(0.64) 
  
-0.125           
(-1.43) 
 
-0.125           
(-1.43) 
 
0.004           
(0.02) 
 
0.004           
(0.02) 
 
0.094           
(1.49) 
 




0.134           
(1.39)  
0.127           
(1.32)  
0.033           
(0.11)  
0.034           
(0.12) 
 
-0.244           
(-1.12) 
 
-0.244           
(-1.12) 
 
0.74           
(1.35) 
 




-0.04           
(-0.51)  
-0.491           
(-0.56)  
0.009           
(0.07)  
-0.133           
(-0.9) 
 
-0.326           
(-2.47) 
 
-0.392           
(-1.45) 
 
-0.166           
(-2.53) 
 




0.120           
(1.86)  
0.125           
(1.91)  
0.038           
(0.93)  
0.038           
(0.93) 
 
-0.089           
(-1.91) 
 
-0.089           
(-1.91) 
 
0.09           
(2.05) 
 




0.132           
(1.91)  
0.132           
(1.91)  
0.063           
(2.42) 
 
0.065           
(2.43) 
 
0.055           
(1.35) 
 
0.055           
(1.35) 
 
0.235           
(1.85) 
 




-0.149           
(-1.33)  
-0.150           
(-1.34)  
0.028           
(0.09)  
0.027           
(0.08) 
 
0.379           
(0.98) 
 
0.379           
(0.98) 
 
-0.948           
(-1.73) 
 




-0.236           
(-2.70)  
-1.652           
(-1.98)  
-0.159           
(-2.02)  
-0.018           
(-2.09) 
 
0.076           
(0.72) 
 
0.072           
(0.71) 
 
-0.041           
(-1.93) 
 




-0.014           
(-0.98)  
-0.016           
(-1.07)  
-0.041           
(-1.61)  
-0.041           
(-1.62) 
 
-0.02           
(-0.89) 
 
-0.02           
(-0.89) 
 
-0.019           
(-1.92) 
 
-0.020           
(-1.94) 
Long term debt 
 
0.124           
(0.56)  
0.141           
(0.62)  
-0.261           
(-1.02)  
-0.259           
(-1.01) 
 
0.955           
(2.43) 
 
0.955           
(2.42) 
 
0.206           
(1.51) 
 




0.729           
(2.15)  
0.708           
(2.05)  
0.195           
(0.27)  
0.2           
(0.27) 
 
0.068           
(0.07) 
 
0.068           
(0.07) 
 
-0.161           
(-0.32) 
 




-1.581           
(-2.36)  
-1.579           
(-2.33)  
0.105           
(0.24)  
0.115           
(0.21) 
 
0.555           
(0.60) 
 
0.554           
(0.60) 
 
0.329           
(1.55) 
 




0.569           
(1.42)  
0.574           
(1.43)  
-0.601           
(-0.35)  
-0.604           
(-0.35) 
 
-4.984           
(-1.74) 
 
-4.985           
(-1.73) 
 
-0.66           
(-1.14) 
 




1.090           
(3.41)  
1.079           
(3.37)  
0.862           
(1.55)  
0.868           
(1.57) 
 
-0.038           
(-0.03) 
 
-0.038           
(-0.03) 
 
0.236           
(1.17) 
 
0.242           
(1.20) 
R&D 
     
1.877           
(0.87)  
1.886           
(0.88) 
 
-16.177           
(-0.97) 
 
-16.187           
(-0.97) 
 
1.45           
(1.83) 
 




0.189           
(2.47)  
0.191           
(2.48)  
0.051           
(1.16)  
0.051           
(1.15) 
 
0.191           
(1.49) 
 
0.191           
(1.48) 
 
0.043           
(1.64) 
 




-7.012           
(-1.94)  
-7.797           
(-2.21)  
0.329           
(1.36)  
0.311           
(1.25) 
 
-1.243           
(-2.60) 
 
-1.244           
(-2.59) 
 
-0.188           
(-2.02) 
 
-0.17           
(-1.79) 
Herfindahl*CU* 
Negative shock    
-0.167           
(-2.83)    










-0.490           
(-1.80) 
Herfindahl*CU 
   
4.785           
(0.53)    














1.44           
(4.01)  
1.523           
(4.34)  
1.304           
(6.01)  
1.309           
(6.00) 
 
1.228           
(5.10) 
 
1.228           
(5.08) 
 
1.147           
(15.15) 
 








































Appendix F  Other dimensions of hedging polices 
The table shows OLS regressions of market share growth difference and relative ROA difference. The 
dependent variables in Model (1)-(2) are the difference between three years after shocks market share growth 
and two years before shock market share growth rate. The dependent variables in Model (3)-(4) are the 
difference between three years after shocks relative ROA and two years before shock relative ROA.  Option 
hedge is dummy of whether firm use option type of derivative to hedge. Hedge other exposure is dummy of whether 
firm also hedge interest rate or exchange rate exposure.  Other variables are defined in Table 2.  All 
independent variables are measured one year before the identified shocks. T-statistics are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors and clustered at the firm level. ***/**/* indicates 1% /5%/10% 
significance level respectively. 












0.188           
(1.17)  
0.233           
(1.52)  
0.059           
(0.72)  




0.161           
(1.13)  
0.187           
(1.30)  
0.100           
(1.05)  




-0.195           
(-2.31)**  
-0.213           
(-2.43)**  
-0.021           
(-2.03)**  




0.034           
(2.45)**  
0.040           
(2.75)***  
0.015           
(2.17)**  
0.014           
(2.05)** 
Long term debt 
 
-0.267           
(-0.90)  
-0.264           
(-0.86)  
0.210           
(1.15)  




-1.453           
(-2.60)**  
-1.309           
(-2.34)**  
0.007           
(0.02)  




-0.479           
(-0.84)  
-0.525           
(-0.94)  
    -      - 
Dividends 
 
-3.955           
(-0.79)  
-4.330           
(-0.83)  
-1.467           
(-0.45)  




0.073           
(0.15)  
0.062           
(0.13)  
-0.127           
(-0.31)  




-2.730           
(-0.84)  
-2.841           
(-0.88)  
-0.957           
(-2.50)**  




0.046           
(0.57)  
0.042           
(0.50)  
-0.061           
(-0.80)  




-0.337           
(-2.06)  
-0.417           
(-2.26)**  
0.117           
(1.08)  




0.102           
(1.74)*    
-0.067           
(-0.93)   
Option hedge*UH 
 
0.309           
(2.03)**    
0.061           
(1.87)*   
Hedge other exposure 
   
-0.043           
(-0.31)    
0.003           
(0.07) 
Hedge other exposure* 
UH    
0.132           
(1.60)    




-0.183           
(-0.99)  
-0.195           
(-1.09)  
-0.062           
(-0.47)  
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